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Introduction	
	
To	paraphrase	Oliver	Lyttleton,	counterinsurgency	is	a	war	waged	by	two	
instruments:	propaganda	and	armed	force.1	These	instruments,	applied	in	a	way	to	
compel	undecided	citizens	to	support	the	fight	against	insurgency	and	that	rally	
people	by	offering	them	an	agenda	that	they	perceive	as	attractive,	are	necessary	for	
true	victory.	A	smart	counterinsurgent	will	enforce	reforms	targeting	the	root	of	the	
unrest,	while	applying	coercion	to	its	manifestations.	Stick	and	carrot,	deftly	
wielded,	may	potentially	cultivate	a	sense	of	legitimacy	and	result	in	fruitful	
relationships	with	the	civilians	who	carry	the	main	burdens	of	war.	Dictatorships	
can	sometimes	suppress	rebellions	by	relying	on	unlimited	force	alone,	but	
democracies	usually	have	no	such	pacification	option.	They	must	meaningfully	
communicate,	appear	morally	sound,	or	otherwise	become	more	appealing	to	the	
civilians	than	the	insurgency;	otherwise,	their	hard	and	painful	effort	will	end	in	
decisive	defeat.		
	 Intelligence	is	the	currency	of	successful	counterinsurgency	operations.	
Coherent	and	up-to-date	intelligence	provides	functional,	actionable	information	to	
target	insurgents	while	preventing	the	killing	or	imprisonment	of	bystanders.	
Civilians,	defectors,	and	captured	rebels	are	the	primary	intelligence	sources	for	the	
counterinsurgent.	In	order	to	get	high-quality	intelligence,	security	agencies	need	to	
build	inroads	into	both	the	civilian	and	insurgent	communities,	which	requires	time.	
This	investment,	done	properly,	may	convince	both	the	civilian	and	rebel	that	the	
																																																								
1	John	A.	Nagl,	Learning	to	Eat	Soup	with	a	Knife:	Counterinsurgency	Lessons	from	Malaya	and	Vietnam	
(Chicago,	IL:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2005).	
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counterinsurgent	means	to	win	this	war,	with	the	result	that	self-interest	will	drive	
them	to	support	the	authorities	rather	than	the	rebellion.			
	 There	is,	however,	one	method	of	intelligence	gathering	that	can	uproot	
every	inch	of	progress	made	toward	building	a	relationship	between	
counterinsurgents	and	civilians.	This	method	is	torture.	If	security	agencies	swallow	
this	poison	pill,	they	will	frustrate	every	future	overture	or	outreach	program	
because	the	memory	of	such	techniques,	especially	if	they	are	institutionalized,	will	
stick	in	the	minds	of	people.	Torture	of	captives	for	information	undermines	the	
moral	legitimacy	of	the	counterinsurgent,	and	surrenders	any	pre-existing	moral	
superiority	to	the	insurgency.	Despite	the	clamouring	of	its	proponents,	torture’s	
limited	effectiveness	cannot	outweigh	the	damage	it	does	to	the	campaign	overall.		
This	study	begins	with	an	analysis	of	the	legal	arguments	surrounding	the	
use	of	torture,	and	the	legal	ambiguity	that	has	allowed	government	to	sanction	
torture.	Understanding	how	supposedly	rational	governments	that	promote	moral	
values	and	human	rights	convince	themselves	of	the	effectiveness	of	torture	
underpins	the	consequences	of	torture	in	the	examined	counterinsurgency	
campaign.	The	first	historical	research	case	study	is	the	1954-1962	Algerian	War,	as	
torture	was	a	hallmark	of	French	operations	in	that	campaign.	It	delivered	victory	in	
battle,	but	cost	the	French	both	the	Fourth	Republic	and	the	war.	The	second	case	
study	is	an	analysis	of	the	foundational	stage	of	the	US	Enhanced	Interrogation	
Techniques	(EIT)	in	Afghanistan,	as	EIT	has	become	a	euphemism	for	torture	in	
counterinsurgency	operations.	Finally,	the	third	case	study	is	an	examination	of	
torture	in	Iraq,	highlighting	both	the	employment	of	the	EIT	program	and	the	
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damage	it	has	done.	As	each	case	indicates,	the	use	of	torture	not	only	torpedoes	
public	relations,	but	amounts	to	strategic	and	operational	self-destruction.	The	case	
studies	conclusively	prove	that	torture	has	no	place	in	a	rational	counterinsurgency	
doctrine.		
The	framework	for	the	analysis	and	argument	against	the	continued	use	of	
torture	for	intelligence	gathering	over	moral	objections	or	other	subjective	elements	
is	based	in	discussions	surrounding	the	rationality	of	the	practice	as	a	tool	of	
counterinsurgency.	Most	of	the	existing	literature	skips	the	question	of	torture	as	a	
rational	tool,	preferring	to	discuss	the	legality	and	moral	degradation	of	the	act.	For	
this	study,	key	works	in	the	field	of	counterinsurgency	have	contributed	their	
analyses	of	the	historical	events	and	consequences	to	the	debate	on	whether	torture	
is	a	rational	weapon	in	the	counterinsurgency	arsenal,	and	whether	its	rationality	
depends	on	circumstances.	Alistair	Horne	provides	a	striking	example	of	torture’s	
self-defeating	prospects	in	Algeria,	where	it	brought	tactical	success	but	heralded	an	
eventual	catastrophic	defeat.2	Having	interviewed	the	torturers,	politicians,	and	the	
tortured,	Horne	showed	that	the	events	surrounding	the	French	victory	during	the	
Battle	of	Algiers	present	a	convincing	argument	in	favour	of	torture,	while	the	
consequences	of	its	application	provide	phenomenal	arguments	against	it.	Conrad	
Crane3	analyzes	the	foundations	behind	modern	US	counterinsurgency	doctrine	in	
the	transitional	period	between	what	remained	of	their	Vietnam	era	thinking,	and	
																																																								
2	Alistair	A.	Horne,	Savage	War	of	Peace:	Algeria	1954-1962,	1st	ed.	(New	York	City,	NY:	Viking	Press,	
1977).	
3	Conrad	C.	Crane,	Cassandra	in	OZ:	Counterinsurgency	and	Future	War,	1st	ed.	(Annapolis,	MA:	Naval	
Institute	Press,	2016);	United	States	Army,	U.S.	Counterinsurgency	Warrior	Handbook	(Guilford,	CN:	
Lyons	Press,	2014).	
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the	holistic	understanding	of	counterinsurgency.	Crane	derides	the	use	of	torture	for	
any	purpose,	while	the	official	manual	offers	solutions	and	discusses	strategies	that	
are	potentially	damaging	to	the	counterinsurgency	if	misconstrued	or	
inappropriately	applied,	and	emphasizes	a	need	to	be	aware	of	unfamiliar	cultural	
norms	of	the	host	nation,	such	as	paternalism,	nepotism,	and	corruption.4	Andrew	
Tan5	discusses	US	counterinsurgency	failures	by	illustrating	how	torture	damaged	
the	US	effort	during	the	Iraq	War.	The	revelation	of	EIT	to	the	world	helped	the	
insurgents	to	sustain	the	very	terror	networks	that	the	US	was	hoping	to	crush.	Tan	
also	analyzes	the	mindsets,	motivations,	and	support	networks	of	the	insurgent	
groups	during	the	Global	War	on	Terror	(GWOT),	thus	demonstrating	how	poorly	
implemented	counterinsurgency	doctrine	can	exacerbate	a	situation.	Intelligence	
shortages,	the	occasional	use	of	indiscriminate	violence,	the	reuse	of	Abu	Ghraib	
prison	with	no	understanding	of	its	grim	image	during	the	Saddam	era,	and	the	
decision-making	process	that	led	to	the	use	of	torture	in	the	first	place	showed	how	
the	consequences	of	these	failures	became	unmanageable.		
Augmenting	the	set	of	specific	works	for	the	case	studies	are	a	brace	of	
publications	that	have	macro	level	analyses	of	counterinsurgency	theory,	or	discuss	
US	doctrine	from	a	specific	historical	lens.	Michael	Shafer	offers	historical	
background	on	what	has	formed	much	of	the	American	perception	of	
counterinsurgency	campaigns.6	What	Shafer	portrays	as	mass	misunderstandings	in	
																																																								
4	Talya	Green,	Joshua	Buckman,	Christopher	Dandeker,	and	Neil	Greenburg,	“The	Impact	of	Culture	
Clash	on	Deployed	Troops,”	Military	Medicine	175,	no.	12	(September	2010):	959.	
5	Andrew	Tan,	U.S.	Strategy	Against	Global	Terrorism:	How	It	Evolved,	Why	It	Failed,	and	Where	It	is	
Headed	(New	York	City,	NY:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2009).	
6	D.	Michael	Shafer,	Deadly	Paradigms:	The	Failure	of	US	Counterinsurgency	Policy	(Princeton,	NJ:	
Princeton	University	Press,	1988).	
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the	US	administrative	complex	and	military	machine	comes	down	to	failures	of	
intelligence	gathering.	By	contrast,	John	Lynn	illustrates	the	broader	role	of	
traditional	espionage	and	surveillance	in	intelligence	gathering,	as	opposed	to	more	
esoteric	discussions	on	torture	and	forced	confessions.7	Publications	from,	and	
interviews	with,	intelligence	community	members	will	also	be	examined	and	drawn	
upon	for	commentary	on	the	use	of	EIT.	In	former	CIA	agent	Douglas	Laux’s	
biography,8	he	talks	about	his	traditional	format	for	infiltration	and	the	intelligence	
coup	against	Improvised	Explosive	Device	manufacturing	in	Iraq	during	his	tenure	
as	a	field	agent.	
	Several	documentaries	from	the	mid-2000s	discussing	the	use	of	EIT	will	
serve	to	underline	the	depth	to	which	the	US	government	was	devoted	to	the	
practice,	and	how	ineffective	it	proved	to	be.		
There	are	almost	as	many	justifications	for	torture	as	there	have	been	
incidents	of	its	use	in	military	settings:	the	enemy	is	unbreakable	otherwise;	the	
need	for	the	information	outweighs	the	rights	of	the	enemy	combatant;	the	enemy	
has	no	protection	under	the	conventions	or	laws	of	war;	revenge;	the	enemy	is	
subhuman;	or	that	the	act	is	effective	regardless	of	its	illegality	or	moral	
repugnancy.	The	proponents	of	torture	claim	that	it	is	justifiable	because	ultimately	
it	saves	the	lives	of	innocent	people.	This	argument	of	ultimate	efficacy	acts	as	the	
final	shield	against	the	array	of	arguments	that	these	proponents	have	already	lost.	
It	is	against	this	last	bastion	of	infringement	upon	the	human	rights	and	protections	
																																																								
7	John	A.	Lynn,	Battle:	A	History	of	Combat	and	Culture	(New	York:	Basic	Books,	2009).	
8	Douglas	Laux,	Left	of	Boom:	How	a	Young	CIA	Case	Officer	Penetrated	the	Taliban	and	Al-Qaeda	(New	
York	City,	NY:	St.	Martin's	Griffin,	2016).	
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afforded	to	a	captured	combatant	by	various	conventions	that	this	study	strikes.	
Torture,	masquerading	under	any	label,	is	an	ineffectual	and	self-defeating	
counterinsurgency	tool.
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Chapter	1:	Torture:	Moral	and	Legal	Debasement	
Legal	arguments	defending	strategy	often	come	down	to	definitions.	In	the	
contexts	of	torture,	and	counterinsurgency,	the	definitions	for	both	have	had	
mercurial	application	throughout	history.	The	lack	of	delineation	creates	avenues	
for	states	to	escape	public	scrutiny	in	their	counterinsurgency	campaigns,	even	
when	they	sanction	torture.	Arguments	about	the	professional	background	of	the	
torturers,	the	identity	of	the	tortured,	the	mechanisms	and	application	of	torture,	
and	to	what	end	often	belong	to	legal	grey	areas	that	are	grounds	for	the	
justification	of	torture.	In	conjunction	with	efforts	to	dodge	the	pre-existing	
definition	of	torture,	or	redefine	the	actions	and	mechanisms	of	torture	so	that	they	
become	outside	the	purview	of	torture,	there	are	regular	efforts	by	proponents	of	
this	method	to	give	it	either	blanket	legal	protection,9	or	to	create	a	set	of	
parameters	within	which	it	is	excused.	
	 The	initial	goal	of	defining	torture	with	the	intent	to	implement	it	ran	afoul	of	
international	and	domestic	definitions	of	torture,	acts	that	fall	short	of	torture,	and	
the	subjects	of	torture.	Opportunities	for	national	deviation	from	international	laws	
and	treaties	appear	predominantly	when	nations	adapt	international	discourse	to	
their	domestic	priorities.	The	United	Nations	Convention	against	Torture	
(UNCAT),10	creates	an	opportunity	for	the	shielding	of	acts	that	resemble	torture	by	
reclassifying	them,	or	under-reporting	damage	caused	to	victims,	such	that	it	does	
not	approach	the	existing	definition	of	torture	provided	within	the	UNCAT.	Under	
																																																								
9	Jerome	Slater,	“Tragic	Choices	in	the	War	on	Terrorism:	Should	We	Try	to	Regulate	and	Control	
Torture,”	Political	Science	Quarterly	121,	no.	2	(November	2,	2006):	205.	
10	Office	of	the	High	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights,	“Convention	against	Torture.”	
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the	UNCAT,	actions	defined	as	“‘torture’	means	any	act	by	which	severe	pain	or	
suffering,	whether	physical	or	mental,	is	intentionally	inflicted	on	a	person,”11	with	
the	goals	of	the	torture	including	the	obtaining	of	information,	or	a	confession,	
among	others.12	Some	governments	seek	to	obtain	leeway	in	their	interrogation	
methods	by	twisting	the	UNCAT’s	definition	of	torture	in	an	effort	to	obtain	
information	or	a	confession,	to	punish	for	alleged	crimes,	or	to	intimidate	or	coerce	
for	any	other	reason.	Some	countries	tried	to	create	leeway	with	regard	to	their	
employment	of	torture	by	interpreting	the	UNCAT’s	definition	of	torture	as	a	limited	
and	specific	definition,	stating	that	their	goal	to	obtain	information	is	the	singular	
goal,	and	the	physical	and	mental	harm	is	not	severe.	The	subjective	interpretation	
of	“severe”	with	regard	to	pain	or	mental	harm	allows	interrogators	to	engage	in	
acts	that	cause	much	distress,	particularly	among	the	majority	Islamic	prisoners	
through,	for	example,	the	destruction	of	Korans	by	flushing	them	down	toilets,13	or	
the	forced	consumption	of	pork,	which	is	forbidden	under	Islamic	law.14	Further	
acts	that	would	be	understandably	considered	torture	by	a	layman,	such	as	
subjecting	prisoners	to	psychological	pressure	through	the	witnessing	of	the	
interrogations	of	others,15	or	through	threats	to	the	families	of	detainees,	were	
																																																								
11	Daniel	L.	Levin,	Acting	Assistant	of	Attorney	General,	Definition	of	Torture	under	18	U.S.C.	§§	2340–
2340A,	Vol.	28	(Washington,	DC:	United	States	Department	of	Justice,	2004),	301.	
12	Ibid.,	300.		
13	John	Mintz,	“Pentagon	Probes	Detainee	Reports	of	Koran	Dumping,”	Washington	Post,	May	14,	
2005.	
14	Jane	Lampman,	“Islam	as	Interrogation	Tool:	Need	for	Limits?”	Christian	Science	Monitor,	May	16,	
2005.	
15	Hernan	Reyes,	“The	Worst	Scars	Are	in	the	Mind:	Psychological	Torture,”	International	Review	of	
the	Red	Cross	89,	no.	867	(September	2007):	594.	
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deemed	to	not	meet	the	qualification	of	“severe.”16	Some	states	sought	to	present	
torture	as	meeting	what	the	UNCAT	delineated	as	“[o]ther	acts	of	cruel,	inhumane,	
or	degrading	treatment	or	punishment	which	do	not	amount	to	torture,”17	thereby	
circumventing	the	protections	and	obligations	these	states	have	under	the	UNCAT.		
	 Related	to	the	use	of	torture,	and	what	the	American	counterinsurgents	
euphemistically	called	Enhanced	Interrogation	Techniques	(EIT)	—	as	outlined	
above	—	are	debates	that	move	beyond	the	legality	of	the	act,	focussing	on	the	
rationality	and	effectiveness	of	its	use..	Some	cling	to	the	viewpoint	that	torture	
delivers	a	form	of	intelligence	skeleton	key,18	or	is	a	tool	to	access	otherwise	
inaccessible	information	on	time-sensitive	terror	attacks.	This	justification,	and	
specifically	the	argument	surrounding	time	sensitivity,	is	the	most	common	gateway	
for	nominally	law-abiding	and	human-rights	championing	states	to	step	into	the	
realm	of	torture.	Pressure	to	come	up	with	suspects	or	illustrate	progress	to	an	
angry	and	frightened	public	both	incentivizes	the	use	of	harsher	intelligence-
gathering	methods	for	the	military	and	increases	the	acceptability	of	such	tactics	in	
the	eyes	of	the	public.	The	event	that	enabled	the	use	of	torture	in	Algeria	was	the	
graphic	bombing	attacks	in	Algiers	launched	by	the	Front	of	National	Liberation	
(FLN)	that	targeted	civilians	broadly,	and	children	specifically.	However,	the	case	of	
Khalid	Sheikh	Mohammad	questions	torture	as	a	useful	tool	in	intelligence	
gathering.19	After	being	waterboarded	183	times	by	American	interrogators,	Khalid	
																																																								
16	International	Human	Rights	Law	Clinic,	Non-Typical	Forms	of	Torture	and	Ill-Treatment,	IHRLC	
Working	Paper	Series	No.	5	(Berkeley,	CA:	Berkley	Law,	University	of	California,	July	2018),	14.	
17	Levin,	302.	
18	Senate	Select	Committee	on	Intelligence,	Committee	Study	of	the	Central	Intelligence	Agency’s	
Detention	and	Interrogation	Program,	S.	Rep.	No.	113-113-288	at	1	(2014),	xi.	
19	Ibid.,	92.		
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Sheikh	Mohammad	confessed	to	approximately	30	attacks,	including	planned,	foiled,	
and	successful	acts	of	terrorism.	However,	he	fabricated	many	of	the	confessed	
plots,20	such	as	the	plan	to	recruit	disgruntled	Muslim	African	Americans	to	commit	
acts	of	domestic	terror	in	the	name	of	Al-Qaeda.21	False	confessions	under	torture	
are	indicative	of	the	risks	and	weaknesses	of	using	torture;	an	enormous	volume	of	
fake	intelligence	often	damages	the	operational	integrity	of	counterinsurgent	
operations,	and	causes	the	misuse	of	precious	personnel,	material,	and	political	
capital.		
	 The	problems	created	by	torture	led	to	the	repeated	backsliding	of	successful	
counterinsurgency	and	counter	terrorism	campaigns;22	they	weakened	domestic	
support	and	led	to	international	condemnation,	once	revelations	about	the	
employment	and	extent	of	torture23	–	or	near	torture	techniques	–	surfaced.	
Theoretical	debates	around	the	use	of	torture	turn	on	the	moralistic,	legal,	ethical,	
and	practical	realms	beyond	a	strict	counterinsurgency	focus.	The	conclusions	
drawn	in	these	parallel	fields	of	study	remain	applicable	as	broad	problems	within	
legal	frameworks;24	the	questions	of	codifying	torture	and	the	effectiveness	of	
torture	remain	the	predominant	pillars	of	all	inquests	into	the	rationality	of	
																																																								
20	Frontline:	Secrets,	Politics	and	Torture,	directed	by	Michael	Kirk	(May	19,	2015),	PBS	documentary,	
54	min.		
21	Ibid.		
22	Tan,	125.	
23	Czarek	Sokolowski,	“Anger	in	Poland	as	It	Is	Forced	to	Pay	CIA	Rendition	Victims,	the	Only	Country	
to	Face	Repercussions	over	Program,”	National	Post,	May	15,	2015.	
24	Eric	A.	Posner	and	Adrian	Vermeule,	“Should	Coercive	Interrogation	Be	Legal?”	Michigan	Law	
Review	104,	no.	671	(February	2006):	673-74.		
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torture.25	Relevant	to	torture’s	legal	framework	are	philosophical	debates	on	harm	
reduction,	use	of	force,	and	human	rights.26	The	impetus	for	the	philosophical	basis	
of	debates	surrounding	torture	is	that	the	base	of	a	great	deal	of	international	and	
human	rights	law	is	entrenched	in	the	writings	of	central	figures	such	as	John	
Locke,27	Thomas	Hobbes,28	and	René	Descartes,29	who	collectively	contributed	to	
the	basis	of	humanitarian,	moralistic,	and	rationally	based	legal	theory.30	Torture	
then,	as	an	inherently	harmful	method	of	intelligence	gathering	with	broader	
impacts,	has	been	justified	by	the	“ticking	bomb”	argument,31	in	which	the	credible	
threat	of	innocent	life	lost	is	resolved	by	torturing	a	suspect	in	order	to	get	
information	unobtainable	through	less	invasive	or	hostile	means.	This	argument	
presents	torture	as	the	unattractive	necessity,	and	relates	closely	to	the	main	
morality-preoccupied	philosophical	discussion	put	forth	about	providing	for	the	
safety	of	many	innocent	lives	at	the	cost	of	the	temporary	suffering	of	one	suspect.	
Changing	the	metrics	of	whether	or	not	torture	of	the	captive	guarantees	the	
information	necessary	to	stop	the	“ticking	bomb”	(or	at	least	reduce	the	number	of	
victims),	the	likelihood	of	torture’s	success,	and	the	guilt	of	the	captive	traditionally	
																																																								
25	William	O'Donohue,	Cassandra	Snipes,	Georgia	Dalto,	Cyndy	Soto,	Alexandros	Maragakis,	and	
Sungjin	Im,	“The	Ethics	of	Enhanced	Interrogations	and	Torture:	A	Reappraisal	of	the	Argument,”	
Ethics	&	Behavior	24,	no.	2	(January	27,	2014):	109-25.	
26	Thomas	Hobbes,	Leviathan,	ed.	Richard	Tuck	(Cambridge,	UK:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1997),	
93.	
27	John	Locke,	“Second	Treatise	of	Government,”	The	Project	Gutenberg	EBook	of	Second	Treatise	of	
Government,	Chapter	2,	Section	4.	
28	Hobbes,	Leviathan,	96.	
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compound	these	thought	exercises	further.32	The	weakness	of	philosophical	debates	
surrounding	torture,	however,	is	the	fixation	on	ethics	and	other	intangible	facets	of	
this	act	while	effectively	disregarding	the	practical	considerations	and	consequences	
that	have	historically	plagued	the	use	of	torture	in	counterinsurgency.33	William	
O’Donohue	authored	several	articles	alongside	his	colleagues	Alexandros	Maraakis,	
Cassandra	Snipes,	and	Cyndy	Soto,	all	of	which	defended	torture	as	an	ethically	
viable	tool	in	the	face	of	threats	against	innocent	lives.	The	underpinning	ethical	
impetus	is	that	so	long	as	many	lives	are	saved,	or	greater	harm	avoided	by	using	
torture	to	extract	life-saving	information,	the	government	or	interrogator	has	a	
moral	and	ethical	duty	to	use	torture.34	A	particularly	telling	recommendation	
contained	within	O’Donohue’s	work	relates	to	the	ability	of	the	state	to	shield	its	
unsavoury	activities	behind	euphemisms.	O’Donohue	recommends	that	the	US	
government	rebrand	its	use	of	torture	for	intelligence	gathering	from	EIT	(Enhanced	
Interrogation	Techniques)	to	“EITSL	(Enhanced	Interrogation	and	Torture	that	
Saves	Lives).”35	The	arguments	attempting	to	construct	an	ethical	application	of	
torture	are	intriguing	rhetorical	exercises,	but	these	attempts	to	defend	torture	by	
comparing	“the	ethical	distinction	between	stabbing	in	a	robbery	…	and	the	use	of	
scalpel	in	surgery”36	demonstrate	a	failure	to	grasp	the	damage	that	implementation	
																																																								
32	O'Donohue	and	others,	“The	Ethics	of	Enhanced	Interrogations,”	111.	
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of	torture	brings	on	a	strategic	level.	An	assertion	that	“certain	preconditions”37	
allow	the	use	of	torture	enables	states	engaged	in	counterinsurgency	to	unilaterally	
construct	conditions	under	which	they	can	justify	torture	–	even	to	the	degree	of	
falsifying	charges	for	the	subject	of	torture38	–	in	an	attempt	to	secure	the	short-
term	goal	of	intelligence.		
	 Integral	to	the	legal	debates	surrounding	torture	is	the	issue	of	combatant	
status,	and	protections	afforded	to	the	participants	in	an	armed	conflict.	The	broad	
rhetorical	frameworks	are	twofold.	The	first	framework	states	that	despite	the	
unofficial	and	stateless	nature	of	the	insurgents	–	as	they	have	no	governing	body	
and	no	defined	uniform	–	they	are	protected	by	the	Laws	of	War,39	Geneva	
Conventions,40	and	United	Nations	conventions	on	the	treatment	of	Prisoners	of	
War.41	Although	the	insurgents	did	not	sign	any	conventions,	their	adherence	to	
Laws	of	War	referring	to	the	collection	of	conventions	and	agreements	–	is	a	
commitment	to	offer	these	protections	to	any	opponent	or	combatant,	without	
prejudice	or	qualification.	In	opposition	to	this	point	of	view	is	the	belief	that	due	to	
the	customary	status	of	portions	of	the	Geneva	Conventions	no	signatory	state	actor	
necessarily	has	to	abide	by	the	protections	contained	within,	nor	offer	them	to	a	
																																																								
37	Ibid.,	374.	
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non-signatory.42	With	regard	to	non-state	actors,	however,	there	have	been	several	
concrete	legal	rulings	determining	that	a	signatory	combatant	is	obligated	to	offer	
the	protections.43	However,	a	proverbial	grey	area	still	exists	and	it	allows	
governments	to	detain	individuals	under	the	title	of	combatant44	and	remove	them	
from	the	civil	and	criminal	codes	of	their	state	in	exchange	for	their	military	justice	
codes,	while	simultaneously	labeling	them	an	illegal	combatant	and	thus	depriving	
them	of	the	protections	afforded	to	combatants	by	the	Laws	of	War.45		
	 So	long	as	the	status	of	the	enemy	force	is	disputed,	and	classified	or	
reclassified	as	an	illegal	combatant,	the	counterinsurgent	has	no	obligation	to	follow	
the	Geneva	Convention,46	and	thus	becomes	effectively	free	to	use	whatever	
methods	are	legal	within	its	own	code	or	set	of	laws	against	the	enemy	combatant.	
Under	the	Geneva	Conventions,	“[a]	combatant	[is]	obliged	to	distinguish	[himself]	
from	the	civilian	population	[and	when]	there	are	situations	where	…	[a]	combatant	
cannot	so	distinguish	himself,	he	shall	retain	his	status	as	a	combatant,	provided	
that	…	he	carries	his	arms	openly,”47	with	the	sub-clauses	demanding	that	this	must	
be	followed	when	“he	is	visible	to	the	adversary.”48	This	clause	creates	a	legal	
opportunity	for	the	state	to	claim	that	the	insurgents	made	themselves	illegal	
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Save	Lives”	,	383.	
43	Tung	Yin,	“Broken	Promises	or	Unrealistic	Expectations:	Comparing	the	Bush	and	Obama	
Administrations	on	Counterterrorism,”	Transnational	Law	&	Contemporary	Problems	20,	no.	465	
(Summer	2011):	477.	
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combatants	by	failing	to	reveal	their	weapons	upon	surveillance,	without	the	
consideration	of	the	insurgents’	operational	reality.	Compounding	the	ability	of	
counterinsurgents	to	manipulate	the	Geneva	Convention’s	definitions	is	Article	37	
on	the	“Prohibition	of	Perfidy.”49	The	major	advantage	that	an	insurgent	has	is	his	
ability	to	hide	among	the	populace,	as	written	by	Mao	Tse-tung	when	recounting	his	
analysis	of	successful	revolutionary	war	strategy	during	the	Chinese	Civil	War.50	
Blending	in	with	the	civilian	population,	or	using	them	as	an	obscuring	shield,	is	
vital	for	the	insurgency’s	survival	against	the	typically	overwhelming	military	power	
advantage	wielded	by	the	counterinsurgents.	Having	the	capacity	to	hide	within	the	
civilian	population	is	of	particular	importance	for	insurgencies	operating	in	areas	
where	the	geography	does	not	permit	them	to	hide	in	the	hinterlands,	such	as	the	
deserts	of	Algeria	and	Iraq.	Article	37	effectively	dictates	whether	or	not	insurgency	
is	to	be	considered	a	legitimate	form	of	resistance	when	combined	with	the	terrain	
that	the	combat	is	occurring	upon;	it	will	spell	doom	for	insurgents	if	they	attempt	
to	hide	in	open	desert	or	tundra,	so	they	are	forced	to	violate	Article	37’s	clauses	to	
survive.	Article	37,	however,	directly	bans	“feigning	of	civilian	[or]	non-combatant	
status”51	with	the	objective	of	killing	or	carrying	out	military	operations.	These	two	
clauses	of	the	Geneva	Conventions	effectively	place	every	insurgent	into	the	realm	of	
illegal	combatants,	stripping	them	of	the	protections	of	the	Geneva	Conventions	if	
they	are	convicted	of	having	breached	these	codes,	or	if	they	have	been	detained	
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without	clearly	worn	insignia.	Effectively,	if	the	captured	insurgents	have	not	
previously	disclosed	that	they	were	insurgents,	then	technically	they	are	already	in	
breach	and	fit	the	label	of	“Unprivileged	Combatants.”52		
	 The	upshot	of	the	struggle	to	determine	the	proper	legal	protections	and	
titles	for	insurgents	during	the	Global	War	on	Terror	led	the	United	States	to	create	
the	legal	heading	of	“Enemy	Combatant,”	as	distinct	from	a	legal	or	illegal	
combatant,	thus	enabling	them	to	deny	these	individuals	the	protections	of	the	
Geneva	Conventions	by	way	of	their	“Unprivileged	Combatant”	status.	Combining	
this	new	heading	with	the	legal	flexibility	of	Enhanced	Interrogation,	the	United	
States	instituted	the	practice	of	what	was	effectively	torture	for	the	use	of	
intelligence	gathering	during	their	counterinsurgency	campaigns.	Torture	has	been	
able	to	provide	intelligence	that	would	have	otherwise	been	unavailable	on	only	a	
handful	of	occasions.	And	efforts	to	generalize	on	these	minute	successes	and	accept	
them	as	unquestionable	proof	of	effectiveness	have	been	willfully	blind	to	the	
strategic,	legal,	and	societal	fallout	of	torture.	Although	the	US	defended	
employment	of	EIT	through	legal	chicaneries,	the	blowback	from	the	international	
community	and	the	American	public	greatly	undermined	operations	against	the	
Taliban	and	Al-Qaeda.	Compounding	the	failure	to	fulfill	legal	duties	and	
responsibilities	toward	detained	enemy	combatants	was	the	American	decision	to	
skirt	the	requirement	contained	within	the	US	accession	to	the	UNCAT	regarding	
responsibility	within	American	jurisdiction	or	on	American	soil.53	The	solution	
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brought	forward	by	the	CIA	was	to	use	“Black	Sites”54	in	foreign	countries	run	by	
cooperative	governments.	American	personnel	could	apply	the	“Enhanced	
Interrogation	Techniques”	in	these	areas	as	it	was	outside	American	jurisdiction,	
and	thus	without	the	direct	responsibilities	of	American	law.	These	Black	Sites,	
located	all	around	the	globe	–	in	Poland,55	Armenia,56	Egypt,57	Syria,	and	Thailand	–	
acted	as	testing	grounds	for	EIT.58		
The	French	experience	with	the	legal	ramifications	of	torture,	and	its	
geographic	spread,	were	far	simpler	than	the	American	manipulation	and	careful	
interpretation	of	international	law.	France’s	experience	with	legalized	torture	ended	
during	the	French	Revolution	that	abolished	it.59	Napoleon	Bonaparte	directly	
opposed	torture,	stating:	“The	barbarous	custom	of	having	men	beaten	who	are	
suspected	of	having	important	secrets	to	reveal	must	be	abolished.	…	The	poor	
wretches	say	anything	that	comes	into	their	mind.”60	The	fact	that	France	rejected	
the	use	of	torture	at	the	peak	of	its	glory	determined	its	aversion	to	this	method	of	
intelligence	acquisition	in	subsequent	conflicts.	The	height	of	French	debates	
surrounding	torture	during	the	War	in	Algeria	came	during	a	series	of	heated	
exchanges	within	the	vehemently	anti-torture	French	National	Assembly	composed	
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of	the	endemically	unstable	Fourth	Republic	Left-Wing	Coalition	government.61	As	a	
result,	despite	the	lack	of	an	official	acknowledgement	of	torture’s	use,	torture	
incidents	hung	around	the	neck	of	the	military	and	civil	government	as	a	strategy	
unpopular	among	the	civilian	population	of	contiguous	France.		
Officially,	the	domestic	legal	codes	of	most	countries	banned	torture.62	Layers	
of	international	law	and	agreements	protecting	universal	human	rights	reinforced	
these	domestic	efforts.63	Yet,	many	states	continue	to	use	torture	regardless	of	their	
accession	to	the	UNCAT,	and	in	direct	contravention	of	their	own	domestic	legal	
codes.	For	authoritarian	states,	with	limited	political	debate	and	weak	public	
opinion,64	the	use	of	torture	lacks	any	serious	consequences.65	These	nations	are	
able	to	swamp	the	media	with	their	versions	of	events,	and	when	boosted	by	their	
strong	internal	security	capacity,66	curtail	critique	of	torture	by	hinting	that	those	
with	too	long	tongues	may	face	a	possibility	of	being	tortured	as	a	consequence.	In	
this	case,	the	only	reservation	about	the	use	of	torture	stems	from	the	cost–benefit	
analysis	made	by	opponents	and	the	greater	populace,	which	can	lead	to	the	
increased	incentive	of	open	and	violent	opposition.	If	the	repression	becomes	
indiscriminate,	there	is	no	incentive	to	remain	compliant	or	supportive	to	the	
government,	as	there	is	no	way	to	avoid	being	the	target	of	the	internal	security	
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apparatus.67	Democracies,	by	comparison,	are	vulnerable	to	social	movements	and	
popular	opinion	within	their	nations	that	can	undermine	popular	support,	and	thus	
power,	should	unpopular	laws	and	actions	such	as	torture	be	implemented.68	The	
cost–benefit	analysis	undertaken	by	democratic	governments	would	then	
theoretically	play	out	to	having	torture	be	an	unattractive	option,	yet	the	French	and	
American	governments	both	resorted	to	torture	despite	the	inevitable	consequences	
of	popular	upheaval.69		
The	most	poignant	difference	between	the	French	and	American	domestic	
social	and	political	reactions	to	the	use	of	torture	is	the	collapse	of	the	Fourth	
Republic	compared	to	the	re-election	of	President	George	W.	Bush	in	2004,70	under	
whom	the	increasingly	unpopular	Iraq	War,	and	the	use	of	EIT,	had	been	ordered,71	
defended,72	expanded,73	and	justified.74	The	second	Bush	administration,	despite	the	
approval	of	EIT	via	their	election,	drew	down	the	usage	of	EIT	in	an	attempt	to	undo	
the	damage	torture	had	wrought.75	The	Obama	administration	finally	banished	it	by	
issuing	a	blanket	ban	on	the	use	of	EIT,	but	created	its	own	legacy	of	mass	human	
rights	abuses	and	creative	interpretation	of	international	laws	via	the	massive	
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investment	and	employment	of	armed	Unmanned	Aerial	Vehicles	(UAV)	for	targeted	
killings.76	These	attacks,	a	new	form	of	terrorism,	also	damaged	the	reputation	of	
the	United	States	in	the	eyes	of	American	allies,77	and	the	American	public.78		
The	legal	battle	over	torture	between	those	who	believe	it	has	inherent	
advantages	when	compared	to	the	traditional	forms	of	intelligence	gathering	and	
those	who	understand	that	it	damages	the	efforts	to	combat	an	insurgency	will	
continue.	Those	who	support	torture	and	were	part	of	the	Bush	administration	try	
to	conceal	the	extent	of	the	EIT	program;	they	cite	documents	that	have	yet	to	be	
declassified79	and	they	have	destroyed	many	documents	and	videotapes	before	
Senate	committees	studying	the	effects	and	effectiveness	of	the	EIT	program	could	
examine	them.80	So	long	as	the	state	is	able	to	effectively	block	access	to	critical	
evidence	or	obscure	it,	it	is	unlikely	that	the	forces	proposing	the	use	of	torture	
within	governments	will	ever	face	effective	opposition.	This	is	particularly	true	for	
dictatorial	regimes	who	are	not	at	the	whim	of	public	opinion.	However,	as	history	
shows,	democracies	that	face	smart,	strong,	and	ruthless	rebels	have	also,	to	their	
detriment,	occasionally	resorted	to	torture	for	intelligence-gathering	purposes.	
Curiously,	the	proponents	of	torture	failed	to	provide	convincing	arguments	
for	its	legalization	despite	their	claims	that	lethal	use	of	force	by	police	has	graver	
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consequences	than	torture.81	For	democracies,	torture	is	a	tempting	but	
counterproductive	shortcut	to	conventional	intelligence	gathering	based	on	human	
intelligence.	Torture	actively	undermines	the	core	efforts	of	counterinsurgents	to	
win	“hearts	and	minds”82	in	rebellious	regions	and	upsets	any	political	competition	
with	the	rebels.	No	matter	the	legal	manipulation	that	could	be	done	to	theoretically	
legalize	the	effort,	it	simply	is	not	worth	the	fallout.	Democracies	must	reject	torture	
as	a	counterinsurgency	tool	and	forfeit	attempts	to	give	torture	legal	protection.	
Torture	has	no	place	in	the	operational	scheme	of	any	security	agency	of	a	
democracy	that	desires	to	achieve	its	national	security	objectives	through	
implementing	a	rational	and	competent	counterinsurgency	doctrine;	efforts	to	skirt	
international	law	to	justify	the	use	of	torture	deceive	no	one	and	only	fuel	rebellion.	
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Chapter	2:	Algeria	(1954-1962):	Winning	to	Lose	
France’s	entanglement	in	Algeria	ended	with	a	civil	war	that	had	a	
counterinsurgency	component.	Algeria	had	belonged	to	France	for	a	little	over	one	
hundred	and	twenty	years	by	the	1950s,	and	the	French	viewed	it	as	an	integral	part	
of	France	for	most	of	this	period.	France	perceived	counterinsurgency	operations	in	
Algeria	not	as	another	distant	colonial	war,	such	as	in	Indochina,	but	as	a	defence	of	
French	soil.83	While	losing	Indochina	had	been	painful,	losing	Algeria	was	
unacceptable;	it	would	be	as	destructive	to	the	French	vision	of	their	nation	as	
losing	Lyon	or	Burgundy.	Algeria	continued	to	have	representation	in	the	French	
Legislature	throughout	the	conflict,	and	held	rights	similar	to	any	other	contiguous	
part	of	France.84	The	recent	loss	of	Indochina	to	the	Viet	Minh	had	humiliated	the	
French	government	and,	in	particular,	the	French	military,	with	defeat	at	the	hands	
of	a	colony	making	the	loss	particularly	poignant.	The	French	military’s	outrage	
primarily	grew	from	the	perceived	betrayal	wrought	by	the	French	government	
after	peace	had	been	negotiated	with	Indochina.	Many	French	soldiers,	especially	
the	elite	Parachute	Regiments	and	French	Foreign	Legion	(FFL),	had	been	captured,	
tortured,	and	sent	to	re-education	camps	by	the	Communists,85	and	when	these	men	
went	on	to	leadership	roles	during	the	Algerian	conflict	they	still	bore	anger	toward	
the	perceived	weakness	and	failure	of	civilian	leadership	during	the	conflict.		
In	the	Algerian	War	of	Independence,	the	anger	and	resentment	within	the	
military	manifested	primarily	in	its	unwillingness	to	meaningfully	pursue	non-
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kinetic	forms	of	counterinsurgency	doctrine,	such	as	the	prioritization	of	passive	
human	intelligence-gathering	opportunities	in	favour	of	direct	capture	operations	
and	interrogations.	Exacerbating	the	French	military’s	proclivity	toward	using	
physical	interrogation	on	civilians	or	informants,	as	well	as	suspected	insurgents,	
was	the	overarching	civil	and	economic	disparity	facing	Algerian	Muslims.86	
France’s	attempts	to	assimilate	the	Algerian	Muslims	into	French	society	included	
having	schools	and	universities	provide	lessons	in	French	only,87	and	incentivizing	
Arabs	who	abandoned	traditional	lifestyles	and	adopted	French	attitudes	by	
enabling	them	with	greater	opportunity	for	upward	social	mobility.	Learned	Arabs	
could	then	be	absorbed	to	some	degree	within	the	colonial	government	and	society.	
Employment	of	Arabs	within	the	French	Algerian	government	was	quite	common,	
even	at	the	height	of	insurgent	campaigns	to	eliminate	these	perceived	
collaborators,	and	Algerians	moved	in	great	numbers	to	find	work	in	the	French	
industrial	regions.	Despite	the	availability	of	Arabs	who	theoretically	could	have	
been	used	as	interlocutors,	the	reality	of	the	situation	was	that	once	Arabs	entered	
into	the	greater	French	sphere	they	became	useless	as	intelligence	agents	or	
infiltrators.	The	FLN	had	an	effective	capacity	to	monitor	and	track	who	had,	in	their	
eyes,	entered	into	the	French	colonialist	machine,	thereby	abandoning	their	Arab	
brothers	–	French-Arab	civil	servants	were	often	targets	of	gruesome	reprisals	by	
the	FLN.88	Without	the	capacity	to	engage	and	exploit	individuals	who	could	
transition	between	the	social	strata	dedicated	to	the	French-speaking	and	French-
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dominated	environment	and	that	of	the	predominantly	Muslim	and	Arabic	
opposition,	the	French	counterinsurgency	effort	was	incentivized	to	engage	in	
harsher	and	more	invasive	methods	of	intelligence	gathering.		
Complicating	the	French	operations	was	the	dichotomy	of	reactionary	
pressure	groups	within	Algeria,	and	France	proper	–	the	early	period	of	the	conflict	
saw	military	and	government	interests	and	thinking	align	with	the	local	European	
Algerian	social	class,	the	Pied	Noir.	The	consistently	intractable	demands	of	the	Pied	
Noir	elites	presuming	their	control	of	the	government	in	French	Algeria	often	
crippled	repeated	Algerian	Arab	and	French	efforts	directed	at	reforms	intended	to	
broker	compromise	with	the	FLN	and	address	the	societal	issues	that	were	at	the	
heart	of	the	move	for	independence.89	The	French	government	attempted	to	cajole	
the	Pied	Noirs	into	compromising	on	the	efforts	of	moderate	Arabs	attempting	to	
alleviate	the	economic	and	social	plight	driving	the	insurgency.90	However,	Pied	
Noir	dominance	in	the	Algerian	legislature	limited	French	efforts	to	employ	soft	
counterinsurgency	methods,	such	as	meaningful	political	reforms	intended	to	
elevate	Arabs’	social	status	and	increase	their	legislative	representation,	and	
economic	reforms	promoting	Arab	entrepreneurship.	These	problems	reduced	the	
number	of	collaborators	willing	to	supply	French	security	agencies	with	intelligence	
on	the	insurgency.	In	the	absence	of	negotiations	between	the	authorities	and	the	
FLN,	the	French	could	not	identify	key	members	of	the	insurgency	and	investigate	
them	for	intelligence-gathering	efforts.	Reluctance	to	offer	amnesties	to	insurgents,	
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many	of	whom	had	committed	gruesome	atrocities,	deprived	the	French	of	the	
opportunity	to	gain	intelligence	from	defecting	insurgents.	Strategic	ignorance,	the	
unpredictable	agenda	of	an	increasingly	unstable	French	government,91	the	Pied	
Noir	resistance	to	a	compromise	with	the	Arabs,	and	disbelief	that	FLN	would	
pursue	a	negotiated	solution	led	the	French	to	follow	a	doctrine	that	viewed	the	
socio-economic	factors	of	counterinsurgency	as	secondary	and	rely	primarily	on	
overwhelming	force:	aggressive	pursuit,	raiding,	and	force	projection	against	the	
centres	of	gravity	binding	the	insurgency	together.92	This	approach	presumed	that	
overwhelming	force	would	persuade	the	FLN	that	resistance	was	impossible	and	
force	them	to	capitulate.		
The	strategic	decision	to	assign	primacy	to	a	military	defeat	of	the	FLN,	
which	implied	reliance	on	ruthless	tactics93	and	had	little	regard	for	the	social,	
political,	and	economic	realities	motivating	Algerians	to	join	the	insurgency,	
invariably	drove	many	formerly	neutral	civilians	into	the	camp	of	the	insurgency.	
New	FLN	recruits	compensated	for	the	grave	casualties	suffered	by	the	insurgents.	
Moderate	Arab	nationalists	who	could	have	acted	as	interlocutors	found	themselves	
driven	out	by	combat-minded	Arab	hardliners,94	or	by	those	radicalized	by	the	
continuing	failures	to	negotiate	and	compromise	with	the	civil	Algerian	government	
and	legislature.	The	Algerian	War	had	started	in	bloody	acts	of	terrorism	during	the	
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All-Saints	Day	Massacre	in	1954.95	The	FLN	regularly	tortured96	and	mutilated	any	
members	of	the	French	security	forces	that	had	been	captured,	and	any	alleged	
collaborators	or	civilian	Pied	Noirs	as	well.	The	horrors	inflicted	on	both	combatant	
and	innocent	civilians	only	increased	throughout	the	fighting,	and	one	such	incident	
was	the	slaughter	of	French	men,	women,	and	children	in	Phillippeville,97	a	
massacre	from	which	only	six	of	the	town’s	inhabitants	would	survive.	The	
inevitable	outcome	of	this	was	Pied	Noir	and	French	military	reprisals	in	the	form	of	
“ratissage”	(the	raking	over	of	neighbourhoods),98	and	repeated	acts	of	merciless	
“ratonnades”	(rat	hunts)99	by	civilians	and	local	security	in	an	effort	to	take	revenge.		
Torture	the	enemy	for	information	is	not	a	preferred	option	for	a	rational	
state,	but	is	the	weapon	of	last	resort	used	when	the	state	regards	the	compliance	of	
the	populace	only	as	a	secondary	objective,	not	as	a	means	to	achieve	victory.	Given	
that	the	French	counterinsurgents	prioritized	the	acquisition	of	critical	intelligence	
over	the	winning	of	Algerians’	hearts	and	minds,	such	a	response	to	the	two	phases	
of	terror	bombings	by	the	FLN	during	the	Battle	of	Algiers	seemed	rational	so	long	
as	the	French	public	remained	unaware	of	the	exact	methods	used	to	combat	the	
insurgency.	The	military	objective	fixation,	combined	with	the	time-sensitive	nature	
of	the	terror	threat	in	Algiers,	took	precedence	once	the	Mayor	of	Algiers	
surrendered	control	of	Algiers’	security	apparatus	to	the	10th	Parachute	Division	
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and	its	commanding	officer	Brigadier	General	Jacques	Massu.100	Under	Massu,	the	
decision	to	employ	torture	as	the	main	strategy	for	breaking	open	the	tightly	
coordinated	bombing	network	run	out	of	the	casbahs	of	Algiers	bore	fruit.	The	
pressure	exerted	during	the	surge	of	snatch-and-torture	efforts	by	French	
paratroopers	resulted	in	a	decrease	in	terror	bombings	and	in	increased	willingness	
from	the	civilian	population	to	collaborate	and	inform	on	the	FLN	insurgents	in	their	
midst.	The	surprising	appearance	of	informers	and	other	collaborators	willing	to	
undermine	the	FLN	terrorist	campaign,	despite	the	unspoken	acknowledgement	of	
the	French	use	of	torture,	points	to	the	conceptually	difficult	duality	of	hard	power	
in	counterinsurgency.	With	the	knowledge	that	these	French	security	forces	were	
using	torture,101	the	civilian	populace	of	Algiers	preferred	the	safety	this	repression	
generated	over	the	promises	of	the	FLN,	due	in	no	small	part	to	the	brutality	of	the	
FLN	terror	campaign	and	its	purposeful	targeting	of	civilians.102	Notably,	the	French	
Special	Administrative	Sections,103	special	units	that	operated	independently	of	
garrisoned	security	forces,	were	able	to	forge	an	effective	fighting	force	from	local	
volunteers,	known	as	the	Harka.104	The	Harka	were	able	to	identify	FLN	insurgents	
within	the	villages	from	which	they	had	been	recruited,	although	they	largely	
operated	as	a	second-line	force.105	Despite	the	influx	of	passive	human	intelligence	
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from	collaborators,	turncoats,	and	paid	informants,106	the	French	military	continued	
to	employ	torture	as	the	primary	method	of	rapid	intelligence	gathering	throughout	
the	campaign	in	the	city	of	Algiers.107	The	consequences	of	relying	on	torture	would	
only	manifest	after	the	conclusion	of	the	campaign	within	Algiers.		
Torture	had	undeniably	made	a	vital	contribution	to	France’s	victory	during	
the	Battle	of	Algiers,	as	the	intelligence	gathered	from	torture	enabled	the	raids	on,	
and	destruction	of,	the	bomb	manufacturing,	distribution,	and	command	network	
operating	within	the	city.	In	parallel,	the	domination	of	the	insurgency’s	battle	space	
by	Massu’s	paratroopers	saw	the	death	or	detention	of	key	FLN	leadership	figures,	
such	as	Ben	M’hidi,	one	of	the	founding	members	of	FLN,108	and	Saadi	Yacef,109	the	
mastermind	of	the	bombing	campaign.110	Massu’s	rapid	deployment	of	his	forces	to	
the	city	allowed	the	French	to	gather	actionable	human-sourced	intelligence	from	
the	suspected	insurgents	and	collaborators	in	a	setting	that	had	long	denied	them	
any	opportunities.	The	French	established	a	tight	procedural	loop	that	enabled	them	
to	immediately	act	upon	time-sensitive	intelligence	extracted	via	torture.111	This	
tactical-level	intelligence,	most	often	the	fastest	to	degrade	or	expire,	was	key	to	
directing	the	raids	that	helped	to	break	the	bomb	network	terrorizing	Algiers.112	In	
the	aftermath	of	the	Battle	of	Algiers,	the	FLN	leadership	cadre	was	in	a	shambles,	
and	the	display	of	combat	effectiveness	and	skill	of	the	Parachute	Divisions,	army	
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regulars,	and	French	Foreign	Legion	units	restored	security	throughout	the	region.	
The	FLN	was	unquestionably	weak	in	that	moment,	and	both	Alistair	Horne113	and	
contemporary	military	analyses114	propose	that	in	those	critical	days	the	French	
could	have	forced	a	peace	settlement	on	the	broken	FLN	and	its	ineffectual	military	
arm,	the	Armée	de	Libération	Nationale	(ALN),	putting	an	end	to	the	war	in	Algeria	
with	a	French	victory.	However,	the	Faustian	bargain	they	made	with	torture	denied	
the	French	military	the	very	capability	they	needed	to	achieve	victory.	Despite	the	
increasing	notoriety	of	torture’s	use	in	Algeria,	the	French	military	continued	to	
practise	it	after	the	battle	of	Algiers,	and	increased	the	breadth	and	catalogue	of	
techniques	at	their	disposal,	thus	losing	a	key	opportunity	for	achieving	victory	over	
the	FLN.		
The	domestic	consequences	of	employing	torture	for	counterinsurgency	are	
usually	grave,	particularly	in	the	context	of	democratic	states	viewing	themselves	as	
champions	of	human	rights	and	international	law,	yet	rarely	has	torture	produced	
such	a	severe	political	crisis	as	it	did	in	France.	The	resort	to	torture	deeply	
disturbed	veteran	French	officers,	particularly	those	with	similar	experiences	to	
Paul	Teitgen,	the	head	of	police	in	Algeria.	Teitgen	had	served	with	distinction	in	the	
French	resistance	during	the	German	occupation,115	and	after	being	captured	by	the	
Gestapo	he	was	deported	to	Dachau,	where	he	was	tortured	nine	times.116	During	
the	Algerian	conflict,	Teitgen	resigned	in	protest	over	the	continuing	and	expanding	
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use	of	torture	by	the	French	military	because	he	felt	it	was	leading	the	
counterinsurgency	effort	and	France	itself	morally	astray.	Teitgen’s	resignation	was	
a	particularly	poignant	rebuke	of	torture	because	he	continued	to	serve	as	the	head	
of	the	police	after	stopping	a	coup	attempt	led	by	the	military	early	in	the	conflict.117	
When	Teitgen	saw	his	countrymen	operating	with	methods	used	by	the	Gestapo,	he	
realized	how	fear	and	rage	could	drive	individuals	who	were	formerly	devout	and	
devoted	to	the	moral	principles	of	freedom	and	liberty	to	use	torture.	Teitgen	faced	
pressure	and	even	temptation	to	use	torture	when	faced	with	a	literal	ticking	time	
bomb	scenario,	but	rose	above	the	coercion	from	his	troops	and	his	own	
temptations.118	In	the	aftermath	of	the	bomb	crisis,	Teitgen	commented,	“All	our	so-
called	civilization	is	covered	with	a	varnish	…	underneath	you	find	fear.	The	French,	
even	the	Germans,	are	not	torturers	by	nature.	But	when	you	see	the	throats	of	your	
copains	slit,	then	the	varnish	disappears.”119		
The	possibility	of	being	tortured	was	not	contained	within	the	geographical	
boundaries	of	Algeria,	as	instances	of	torture	clung	to	returning	soldiers	and	
security	forces	like	barnacles	on	a	ship.	French	soldiers	returning	from	tours	in	
Algeria	regularly	complained	of	nightmares120	or	other	maladies	that	are	now	
recognized	as	clear	signs	of	post-traumatic	stress	disorder.	The	mental	health	of	
troops	operating	as	torturers	suffered,	and	the	rationality	of	their	judgment	
atrophied	in	the	aftermath	of	the	French	counterinsurgency	operations.	As	one	of	
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them	described,	“I	felt	myself	becoming	contaminated.”121	A	tragic	example	of	
torture’s	caustic	nature	is	the	police	inspector	who,	after	torturing	his	own	wife	and	
children,	cited	his	past	torturing	of	Algerian	suspects	as	the	trigger	for	his	own	
neurosis.122	In	1961,	the	Paris	metropolitan	police	occasionally	threw	pro-Algerian	
protestors	into	the	Seine	River,123	with	the	most	prominent	incident	being	the	
crackdown	against	a	massive	protest	that	ended	with	approximately	150	Algerians	
dying	at	the	hands	of	French	police.124	Anti-war	protests	in	Paris	were	regularly	met	
with	heavy-handed	police	response:	deaths	among	the	protestors	were	frequent;125	
some	international	correspondents	were	beaten,	while	French	journalists	were	
jailed;126	and	many	arrested	Algerians	were	deported	back	to	Algeria.	There	were	
also	several	instances	of	French	police	copying	methods	used	in	Algeria,	as	the	
lynching	of	detainees	in	the	woods	around	Paris	demonstrates.127		
Within	Algeria,	the	extremes	of	prisoner	mistreatment	graphically	
culminated	in	the	incarceration	of	101	detainees	in	a	single	room	for	over	a	day.128	
This	led	to	the	deaths	of	41	prisoners129	as	they	suffocated	in	the	cramped	
conditions.	This	incident	demonstrated	to	civil	society	that	the	military	was	not	
simply	pursuing	a	matter	of	intelligence	gathering	against	an	entrenched	enemy,	but	
was	actively	treating	the	captives	as	nothing	more	than	a	biological	resource	that	
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could	be	exploited	and	did	not	require	the	application	of	moral	scruples.130	The	
effectiveness	of	torture	for	the	gathering	of	intelligence	was	undeniable	during	the	
Battle	of	Algiers,	and	in	those	circumstances	it	was	arguably	rational	as	a	tactic	but	
not	as	a	strategy.	The	men	spearheading	torture	in	Algeria	were	given	increased	
authority,	and	the	defining	military	plan,	the	“Challe	Plan,”131	called	for	intelligence	
acquisition	“through	all	possible	means.”132	Despite	an	official	prohibition	of	torture,	
the	Plan	institutionalized	information-gathering	methods	deemed	most	effective	by	
contemporary	analysis	in	spite	of	their	undeniable	consequences.		
By	the	date	of	Teitgen’s	resignation,	he	estimated	that	approximately	3,000	
Algerians	had	“disappeared,”133	a	term	that	specifically	captures	the	“inconvenient”	
innocents	and	suspected	insurgents	who	had	been	tortured	to	death	by	French	
paratroopers	and	regular	French	military	units.	The	security	forces	dealt	with	the	
victims	by	burying	their	mutilated	and	disfigured	bodies	in	gardens	covered	in	
quicklime	to	destroy	the	evidence134	or	taking	them	to	the	woods	to	be	buried;135	
other	victims	were	flown	out	to	sea,	where	they	were	thrown	to	their	deaths.136	The	
threat	and	fear	of	being	disappeared	was	not	geographically	limited	to	Arabs,	as	
several	French	paratroopers	recall	having	tortured	Europeans	during	their	tenure	in	
Algeria.137	French	citizens	whom	the	military	suspected	of	collaboration	with	the	
Algerian	insurgency	would	earn	a	trip	to	Algeria	where	they	experienced	the	
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mercies	of	whichever	torture	technique	was	in	vogue.	Key	figures	in	the	Algerian	
nationalist	movement,	such	as	Henri	Alleg,138	were	threatened	with	having	their	
families	transported	to	Algeria	to	be	tortured.139	The	French	military	curtailed	all	
avenues	of	moral	objection	through	peer	pressure,140	and	training	schools	were	
established	to	disseminate	the	various	techniques	of	torture.	French	paratroopers	
also	employed	the	classic	facilitating	method	of	dehumanizing	their	victims,	only	
rarely	referring	to	them	by	their	names,	preferring	to	use	“rat”141	in	order	to	deprive	
their	victims	of	their	humanity.	In	the	words	of	General	Bollardiere,	a	vocal	
opponent	of	torture,	“It’s	easy	to	torture	a	bougnoul	[rat],	because	you	figure	he’s	
not	a	human	being.”142	Despite	the	firm	grip	Frenchmen	keep	to	their	Catholicism	as	
a	moral	guide,	this	point	of	potential	objection	and	resistance	was	circumvented	by	
the	military,	specifically	the	20th	Paratrooper	Division’s	commander	ordering	the	
unit’s	chaplains	to	invent	whatever	religious	sanctions143	were	necessary	to	justify	
the	use	of	torture	in	the	minds	of	the	French	troops	charged	with	gathering	
intelligence.	Hardening	the	hearts	of	French	soldiers	to	moral	objections	inspired	by	
religious	contemplation	was	an	act	meant	to	reinforce	the	peer-derived	education	
and	pressure	to	continue	the	use	of	torture	for	gathering	intelligence.	
The	majority	of	proponents	for	torture	remained	within	the	French	military	
and	among	the	Pied	Noirs,144	who	had	the	most	to	lose	should	the	French	Army	
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prove	unsuccessful	in	defeating	the	insurgency	in	Algeria.	French	law	demands	a	
death	penalty	for	any	who	carry	out	the	act	of	torture.145	However,	as	the	loyalty	of	
the	professional	soldiers	in	Algeria	moved	from	the	state	to	their	officers	and	
comrades,	the	ability	of	the	French	government	to	impose	its	will	over	these	men	
evaporated.		
The	most	dramatic	episode	in	French	politics	was	a	coup	attempt	carried	out	
by	the	Organization	Armée	Secrète	(OAS).146	The	OAS,	a	right-wing	group	
dominated	by	members	of	the	French	Military,	included	the	likes	of	Massu’s	second-
in-command,	Yves	Godard,	and	Raoul	Salan,	the	commander-in-chief	of	French	
military	operations	within	Algeria,147	with	their	espoused	goal	being	to	keep	Algeria	
a	part	of	France	by	any	means	necessary.	The	OAS’s	later	actions	would	include	an	
ironic	mimicry	of	the	FLN	with	an	armed	insurgency	flaring	up	under	the	OAS	in	the	
final	days	of	French	Algeria.148	The	OAS	sought	to	assassinate	key	French	politicians,	
including	Charles	de	Gaulle,149	though	direct	military	support	had	only	gone	as	far	
the	May	13th	coup,	and	the	subsequent	return	of	de	Gaulle.150	With	the	senior	
commanders	engaged	in	coup	attempts	against	the	central	government,	combined	
with	civil	unrest	within	France	and	the	deeply	unpopular	governmental	structure,	
the	collapse	of	the	Fourth	Republic	was	unavoidable;	it	finally	crumbled	in	1958	
during	the	May	13th	crisis.151	In	the	chaos,	Charles	de	Gaulle	exited	retirement,	and	
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returned	at	the	behest	of	the	outgoing	government.152	Charles	de	Gaulle	enjoyed	
significant	popularity	among	the	military,	unlike	the	detested	civil	politicians.153	
President	de	Gaulle	introduced	the	socially	unpopular	but	politically	necessary	
amnesty	for	all	war	crimes	committed	in	Algeria	in	1962,154	in	line	with	the	final	
negotiations	that	arranged	for	the	transfer	of	power	and	the	French	withdrawal	
from	Algeria.155	The	amnesty	was	arguably	due	in	large	part	to	the	continuation	of	
the	Fourth	Republic’s	proclivity	for	harsh	interrogations	into	the	Fifth	Republic’s	
counterinsurgency	doctrine.156	Under	de	Gaulle’s	reinvigorating	leadership,	the	
French	operations	in	Algeria	retained	the	veneer	of	military	dominance	in	the	
counterinsurgency	doctrine,	but	the	new	doctrine	also	sought	to	create	conditions	
for	a	negotiated	end	to	the	conflict,	and	of	France’s	involvement	in	Algeria.157		
Despite	the	resolute	French	legal	requirement	that	criminals	convicted	of	
using	torture	would	face	the	guillotine,	there	did	exist	a	short-lived	overture	that	
questioned	whether	it	would	be	better	for	the	French	international	and	domestic	
image	to	legitimize	the	French	military’s	actions	in	Algeria.	The	Fourth	Republic	
directed	Inspector	General	Roger	Wuillaume	to	suggest	solutions	for	the	problem	of	
torture.158	In	the	report,159	likening	the	uncontrollable	use	of	torture	to	solutions	
applied	to	a	rampant	black	market,	Wuillaume	recommended	legislating	the	use	of	
torture	in	an	attempt	to	at	least	regain	some	level	of	control	over	the	program.	
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Wuillaume’s	solution	was	to	create	a	category	of	torture	that,	so	long	as	it	induced	
only	psychological	damage	with	a	limited	physical	impact,	could	be	legally	approved	
and	accepted.	However,	the	French	government	immediately	and	emphatically	
refused	Wuillaume’s	suggestion	to	legislate	torture	to	control	it,160	viewing	it	as	
surrendering	legislative	power	to	the	military,	especially	as	the	impetus	for	the	
legalization	was	the	already	illegal	actions	of	the	French	armed	forces.	The	French	
government	also	refused	to	entertain	the	recommendations	of	Wuillaume’s	report	
on	the	grounds	that	they	were	in	direct	contravention	of	the	French	notions	of	
human	decency,	and	of	France’s	national	moral	values.	Wuillaume,	however,	
observed	that	the	French	counterinsurgents	in	Algeria	would	continue	to	use	
torture	widely	regardless	of	its	legality.161	
The	ultimate	damage	inflicted	through	the	use	of	torture,	the	subsequent	
cover-ups	by	the	French	government,162	and	the	resistance	toward	government	
oversight	by	the	military	manifested	in	the	collapse	of	the	Fourth	Republic	and	the	
inability	to	exploit	the	weakness	of	the	FLN	after	the	Battle	of	Algiers.	Among	the	
strategic	consequences	of	torture	was	the	political	decision	under	the	Fifth	Republic	
to	step	down	the	commitment	to	Algeria,	and	ultimately	pursue	a	negotiated	
withdrawal	and	end	to	hostilities	in	the	region.	Despite	the	introduction	of	sweeping	
reforms	in	operational	doctrine	and	counterinsurgency	planning	during	the	Fifth	
Republic,	as	well	as	the	curtailing	of	Pied	Noir	mass	violence,	illustrated	by	the	
marked	drop	in	“raking	over”	attacks	and	“rat	hunts”	undertaken	after	1958,	the	
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war	against	the	FLN	had	been	lost.	The	French	military	was	winning	victory	after	
victory,	yet	in	spite	of	this	dominance	on	the	operational	level,	the	strategic	realm	
was	firmly	controlled	by	actors	moving	toward	an	outcome	favoured	by	the	FLN.163	
Torture	enabled	elimination	of	the	FLN’s	many	cells,	yet	this	method,	so	inimical	to	
French	social	and	political	moral	moorings,	crippled	in	the	end	the	effectiveness	of	
France’s	response	to	the	rebellion.	Lacking	the	domestic	support	and	commitment	
for	continued	operations	against	the	FLN	in	Algeria	under	both	the	Fourth	and	Fifth	
Republics,	a	series	of	military	victories	did	not	lead	to	a	strategic	breakthrough.	
Modern	insurgencies	can	rarely	be	beaten	by	naked	aggression	alone;	mastering	the	
intertwined	political	and	economic	motivations	of	insurgents	and	undermining	
these	mobilizing	points	is	integral	to	a	successful	counterinsurgency	campaign.	
Torture	is	indicative	of	a	failure	to	grasp	this	necessary	understanding,	and	within	
Algeria	the	French	use	of	torture	eviscerated	domestic	public	support	for	the	
counterinsurgency	campaign,	and	undermined	the	government’s	willingness	to	
commit	further	resources	to	the	operational	capacity	of	the	military.	Victory	in	
Algeria	against	the	FLN	would	have	been	difficult	without	the	use	of	torture	for	
gathering	information,	but	after	the	employment	of	torture	on	a	strategic	scale,	the	
preconditions	for	victory	became	impossible	to	fulfill.	
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Chapter	3:	Afghanistan	(2001-2021):	Rising	Just	to	Fall	
The	late	20th	and	early	21st	centuries	witnessed	a	rapid	growth	of	Islamic	
fundamentalism,	with	international	terrorism	as	the	primary	weapon	of	choice.	The	
key	event	that	first	triggered	this	growth	was	the	victory	of	the	Mujahedeen	over	
Soviet	intervention	into	the	Afghan	civil	war	because	it	was	perceived	as	an	Islamic	
victory	over	an	atheist	superpower	by	the	imams	and	preachers	who	rallied	a	large	
part	of	the	Islamic	world	into	jihad	against	the	infidels.	Compounding	the	rapid	
growth	of	terrorist	networks	in	the	1990s	was	the	collapse	of	the	Warsaw	Pact	and	
the	Eastern	Bloc	as	weapons	flowed	from	their	arsenals	into	the	hands	of	rogue	
states,	or	left	in	the	hands	of	the	men	who	carried	them	from	the	service	of	the	state	
to	whatever	individual	group	radicalized	them	first.164	The	crucial	group	in	this	
camp	was	the	Mujahedeen’s	massive	network	comprised	of	interoperating	and	
cooperating	Islamic	fighters	from	all	over	the	world,	and	financiers	who	had	gained	
expertise	and	weapons	following	the	Soviet	invasion	of	Afghanistan.	Although	the	
Mujahedeen	subdivided	into	religiously	segregated	Shia	and	Sunni	forces,165	
between	which	the	fighting	was	often	just	as	fierce	and	brutal	as	that	against	the	
Soviet	forces	in	Afghanistan,166	the	dominant	Sunni	groups	emerged	as	Al-Qaeda	
(AQ),	a	capable	terrorist	network	that	recruited	the	radicalized	Muslims	primarily	
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from	the	Middle	East	but	also	from	Pakistan,	South-East	Asia,	Chechnya,167	the	
former	Yugoslavia,168	and	fracturing	states	and	governments	all	over	Africa.169	The	
global	threat	of	Al-Qaeda	required	previously	unseen	levels	of	cooperation	between	
intelligence	agencies,	yet	the	variety	of	potential	threats	spread	the	efforts	of	the	
future	counterinsurgents	thin.	While	keeping	tendrils	of	influence	all	around	the	
globe,	the	United	States’	Central	Intelligence	Agency	(CIA)	had	only	obscure	
warnings	from	its	shrinking	traditional	intelligence	network	in	Afghanistan	that	a	
major	attack	was	coming.	The	obsession	with	preventing	the	blindness	that	would	
lead	to	the	events	of	September	11th	guided	the	United	States	to	the	use	of	torture.	
The	September	11th	terrorist	act	was	the	most	devastating	attack	on	
American	soil	since	Pearl	Harbor.	This	trauma	can	be	compared	to	the	aftermath	of	
December	7th,	1941,	as	the	American	populace	and	government	reeled,	and	almost	
immediately	swung	out	blindly	against	anyone	perceived	as	the	enemy,	as	the	
murder	of	Balbir	Singh	Sodhi,170	a	Sikh	mistaken	for	a	Muslim,	attests.	It	was	
shocking	to	realize	that	intelligence	gained	by	traditional	methods	in	the	days	
leading	up	to	the	attack	forewarned	of	a	possible	threat	against	the	United	States	
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using	the	medium	of	hijacked	airliners	—	though	this	was	displaced	by	streams	of	
other	prioritized	intelligence	reports	due	to	the	perceived	low	chance	of	success.171	
The	pre-existing	massive	base	of	intelligence	built	up	during	the	1990s	and	
in	the	days	immediately	following	the	attacks	on	September	11th	guided	early	
operations	in	Afghanistan.	The	Taliban	operated	largely	as	a	conventional	force	
preceding	the	American	invasion	of	Afghanistan	(dubbed	Operation	Enduring	
Freedom),172	and	as	such	their	movements	and	larger	forces	were	vulnerable	to	the	
massive	technological	surveillance	of	the	American	intelligence	agencies	and	of	the	
American	Special	Operations	Command	(SOCOM).173	For	years	before	Operation	
Enduring	Freedom	began	there	had	been	photographic	and	thermal	images	showing	
AQ	training	facilities	within	Afghanistan174	as	the	United	States	had	acted	against	
the	primordial	AQ	in	response	to	the	bombing	of	the	USS	Cole.175	The	American	and	
NATO	forces	going	into	Afghanistan	gathered	intelligence	through	satellite	
photography	and	unmanned	and	manned	aerial	and	ground	surveillance;	they	also	
collected	general	human	intelligence.	These	efforts	allowed	the	Coalition	forces	to	
spot	and	quickly	eliminate	the	Taliban’s	strongholds,	training	bases,	major	
formations,	and	AQ	allies	while	limiting	civilian	endangerment,	the	in-country	
Coalition	footprint,	and	the	overall	cost	of	the	operations.	The	outcome	largely	
cemented	the	American	obsession	with	the	Revolution	in	Military	Affairs	(RMA)	
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school	of	thought.176	RMA	contends	that	contemporary	standing	armies	become	
obsolete;	smaller	forces	equipped	with	state-of-the-art	technology	can	attain	their	
desired	objectives	more	effectively	and	faster.	RMA’s	core	principles	are	high	
mobility,	sophisticated	weapons,	and	low	footprint,	all	of	which	proved	effective	in	
the	First	Gulf	War,	former	Yugoslavia,	and	the	invasions	of	Iraq	and	Afghanistan.	
However,	the	small	troop	complement	predicated	by	RMA	thought	makes	it	an	
insufficient	tool	to	meet	the	demands	of	an	extended	counterinsurgency	
campaign.177		
The	United	States	and	its	NATO	allies	swept	aside	the	weak	Taliban	
conventional	army	and	dominated	the	battlefield.	However,	the	hard	deceleration	of	
this	successful	momentum	began	once	battlefield	conditions	outpaced	intelligence.	
The	first	major	failure	for	the	counterinsurgency	campaign,	and	for	the	GWOT	
overall,	began	with	Operation	Anaconda	and	the	assault	on	Tora	Bora	and	its	
massive	cave	complexes.178	Coalition	intelligence	accurately	pinpointed	the	location	
of	not	only	Osama	Bin	Laden,	but	also	other	leaders	of	AQ	and	the	Taliban,	as	well	as	
foreign	fighters.179	Starved	of	resources	and	the	necessary	human	intelligence,	the	
effort	to	both	secure	Tora	Bora	and	capture	Osama	Bin	Laden	and	the	Al-Qaeda	
commanders	failed.	The	failure	of	Operation	Anaconda	stemmed	from	the	inability	
to	control	the	few	passages	into	and	out	of	Tora	Bora,	and	the	inability	to	grasp	
Osama	Bin	Laden’s	popularity	within	the	villages	that	controlled	these	passages.	By	
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failing	to	integrate	Coalition-friendly	human	intelligence	assets	on	the	ground,	and	
counter	the	Taliban-AQ	forces’	human	intelligence	capabilities,	the	attempt	to	
decapitate	insurgent	leadership	failed.	Al-Qaeda	leaders	and	Taliban	fighters	slipped	
through	friendly	villages	over	the	border	with	Pakistan,	allowing	both	organizations	
to	maintain	a	strategic	level	of	leadership	and	guidance	as	the	campaign	began	
drifting	into	a	sphere	of	unconventional	warfare.	
The	greatest	strategic	blunder	of	the	Coalition,	however,	was	the	failure	to	
invest	in	post-Taliban	reconstruction	and	stabilization	to	avoid	the	chaos	and	
factionalism	that	frequently	plagued	and	divided	the	Afghan	nation.	The	Pashtuns	
supported	the	Taliban,	while	the	Uzbek,	Tajik,	and	Hazara	factions	forming	the	
Northern	Alliance	had	different	attitudes	toward	the	International	Security	
Assistance	Force	(ISAF),	NATO,	and	United	Nations,	all	of	which	supported	
leadership	of	the	new	Afghan	government	headed	by	Hamid	Karzai.180	Complicating	
US	operations	in	Afghanistan	was	the	nebulous	role	of	Pakistan’s	Inter-Service	
Intelligence:181	despite	their	nominal	alliance	with	the	United	States,	the	Inter-
Service	Intelligence	often	operated	in	a	manner	that	was	directly	counterproductive	
to	the	US-led	Coalition.	The	Inter-Service	Intelligence	at	times	directly	funded,	
armed,	and	supported	the	Pakistani	Taliban	–	a	group	almost	directly	intertwined	
with	the	Afghani	Taliban.182	
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The	matter	of	Afghanistan’s	human	terrain	complicated	the	gathering	of	
human	intelligence.183	The	United	States	treated	the	Northern	Alliance	as	though	it	
were	a	concrete	whole	of	interests	and	objectives,	but	in	truth	their	cooperation	
relied	heavily	on	a	joint	desire	to	remove	the	Taliban,	not	on	the	security	of	
Afghanistan	as	a	whole.184	The	misperception	of	Afghan	warring	parties	perceived	
as	allies	continued	despite	clear	evidence	to	the	contrary	originating	from	reports	
filed	by	SOCOM	agencies,	including	American	Green	Berets.185	These	agencies	were	
aware	and	sensitive	to	the	extreme	diversity	of	the	Northern	Alliance,	as	SOCOM	
regularly	stressed	the	complexity	of	the	situation	on	the	ground.186	Great	political	
challenges	stemming	from	the	tribal	nature	of	Afghan	society	undermined	the	ISAF’s	
goal	of	asserting	a	strong	central	government	in	Afghanistan	and	limited	the	efforts	
of	the	Afghan	National	Army	(ANA)	and	Afghan	National	Police	(ANP)	directed	
toward	this	common	goal.	The	ISAF	and	ANA	were	both	equally	foreign	to	Afghani	
tribal	groups	populating	remote	areas.187	Those	who	supported	the	ISAF	as	opposed	
to	AQ	did	it	only	because	they	understood	that	support	of	AQ	would	lead	to	a	return	
of	the	hated	Taliban.188	With	ethnically	diverse	northern	Afghanistan	facing	the	
predominantly	pro-Taliban	Pashtu	in	the	south,	there	were	obstacles	to	intelligence	
penetration	that	were	difficult	to	overcome.	
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The	ANA	and	ANP	could	not	achieve	concrete	and	meaningful	results	from	
their	military	actions	against	the	Taliban,189	and	at	the	same	time,	their	regular	
employment	of	torture,	not	just	for	intelligence	gathering	but	also	as	a	form	of	
retaliation	against	the	Taliban,190	exacerbated	their	unpopularity	with	the	Afghan	
people	and	damaged	international	cooperation	between	the	Afghan	security	
apparatus	and	its	international	partners.191	Canada	ceased	its	transfer	of	suspected	
Taliban	detainees	to	ANA	and	ANP	because	Canadian	legislation	banned	the	turning	
over	of	prisoners	or	deportees	to	states	or	groups	who	are	likely	to	torture	them.192	
The	continuing	transfer	of	captured	AQ	and	Taliban	forces	to	American	
interrogators	saw	no	parallel	interruption,	despite	clear	evidence	that	Americans	
used	torture	in	both	Afghanistan	and	Iraq.193	The	Taliban	also	tortured	captured	
ANA	soldiers194	and	it	is	unclear	whether	they	did	it	to	gain	intelligence	from	their	
captives	or	simply	in	retaliation;	after	all,	the	massive	operational	security	problems	
plaguing	the	ANA	and	ANP	led	to	the	steady	leakage	of	important	information	to	the	
Taliban.195	
The	use	of	torture	by	the	CIA,	ANA,	and	ANP	heavily	damaged	the	effort	to	
legitimize	the	Afghan	government,	and	also	restricted	the	flow	of	information	from	
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demoralized,	unmotivated	insurgents	willing	otherwise	to	take	amnesties.	Defectors	
are	critical	for	obtaining	intelligence	in	counterinsurgency,	as	they	bring	with	them	
invaluable	internal	knowledge	about	key	leaders,	recruiters,	and	suppliers	and	their	
methods.196	Former	terrorists	and	insurgents	can	also	be	exploited	for	political	
purposes;	turncoat	insurgents	denounce	their	colleagues	or	spread	propaganda	to	
de-legitimize	an	insurgency.197	Within	Afghanistan,	however,	the	lack	of	incentives	
to	defect,	and	the	lack	of	moral	legitimacy	among	the	United	States	and	its	allies,198	
undermined	defection	of	the	disaffected	Taliban	fighters.	The	Coalition	failed	to	
retain	a	focus	on	Afghanistan,199	and	it	did	not	establish	or	cultivate	a	viable	
economic	and	socially	legitimate	government;200	it	focused	mainly	on	the	military	
aspects	of	pacification	as	opposed	to	the	motivating	factors	of	the	rebellion.201	
The	United	States	and	its	NATO	allies	entered	Afghanistan	ill	prepared	for	the	
rapid	transition	between	fighting	a	limited	conventional	war	against	the	regular	
formations	of	the	Taliban	government	and	the	massive	and	multifaceted	
counterinsurgency	that	rapidly	grew	in	the	aftermath.	They	found	themselves	
without	the	key	linkage	between	the	external	intelligence	organizations	and	the	
sources	of	information	on	the	ground.	Some	members	of	NATO,	such	as	Germany	or	
Spain,	were	familiar	with	the	counterinsurgency	strategy	in	the	national	context,	as	
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the	German	security	agencies	had	fought	the	Red	Army	Faction	(RAF),202	while	the	
Spanish	ones	had	struggled	against	the	Basque	terrorists	of	the	Euskadi	Ta	
Askatasuna	(ETA).203	However,	this	experience	was	of	little	help	against	an	
entrenched	foe	within	hostile	terrain	in	a	foreign	country.	The	United	States	did	
develop	a	counterinsurgency	doctrine	during	the	Vietnam	War,	as	did	Britain	during	
the	Malayan	Emergency	and	in	campaigns	against	the	Mau-Mau	rebels	in	Kenya204	
and	the	Irish	Republican	Army,205	but	the	defeat	in	Vietnam	discredited	US	doctrine.	
NATO	failed	to	develop	a	common	counterinsurgency	doctrine.	The	US	Army	
experiments	with	two	opposite	approaches	to	pacification	exemplified	by	the	Hard,	
or	Enemy-Centric	counterinsurgency,206	and	Soft,	or	Population	centric	
counterinsurgency,207	were	inconclusive;	their	only	conclusive	element	was	the	
realization	that	both	cooperation	between	counterinsurgents	and	the	local	
population	providing	accurate	intelligence	were	vital	for	success.		
The	counter-intelligence	capability	of	Al-Qaeda	was	extensive;	it	had	clear	
guidelines	on	how	to	avoid	intrusion	by	the	global	intelligence	community.	AQ	could	
effectively	impede	some	of	the	CIA	and	NATO	intelligence	efforts	to	penetrate	into	
their	command	structure	by	rapidly	adapting	their	protocols	for	communication.	
After	Al-Qaeda	agents	became	aware	of	the	CIA’s	ability	to	breach	the	satellite	
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phones	used	by	their	leaders,208	the	protocol	changed	multiple	times	to	decentralize	
communications	and	thus	avoid	direct	tracking	efforts.	The	adaptation	of	the	
communication	pattern	was	effective:	it	took	the	United	States	a	long	time	to	track	
and	eliminate	Osama	Bin	Laden.		
NATO’s	detainee	processing	system	handicapped	counterinsurgency	efforts.	
A	definitional	framework	did	not	appear	for	several	weeks	for	detained	individuals	
within	Afghanistan,	well	after	the	US-led	Operation	Enduring	Freedom.209	The	lack	
of	guidelines	for	the	treatment	of	detainees	within	the	armed	forces	resulted	in	
confusion,	abuses,	and	the	establishment	of	ad	hoc	frameworks	outside	the	
constraints	of	international	law.210	The	US	and	NATO	units	within	Afghanistan	
employed	local	militias	to	boost	their	efforts	and	to	extract	information	from	
captured	Taliban	fighters	during	this	period;	the	militia	units	lacked	a	concrete	
policy	for	detainees	and	employed	a	host	of	practices	banned	by	NATO.	The	
methods	used	by	the	proto-ANA	and	local	militiamen	were	brutal	by	international	
standards,	with	torture	of	varying	techniques	being	the	heart	of	the	
interrogations.211	The	failure	to	establish	a	definitive	plan	for	dealing	with	captured	
terrorists	and	insurgents	resulted	in	the	tactical	application	of	torture	for	small-
scale	information	extraction	believed	to	be	crucial	for	strategic	success.	This	
perception	normalized	physical	interrogation	techniques,	and	resembled	the	
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Taliban’s	interrogation	method,212	which	crippled	the	legitimacy	of	the	Afghan	
government	in	the	eyes	of	the	Afghan	people.213		
Determining	the	protections	vis-à-vis	the	prisoners	taken	by	NATO	units	
required	the	creation	of	a	new	legal	definition;	specifically,	one	that	would	enable	
the	extraordinary	rendition	and	intelligence	exploitation	of	these	detainees.	
Conditions	of	detention	required	creative	legal	analysis.	The	challenge	was	due	in	
part	to	the	inconsistent	nature	of	the	Taliban’s	position	as	a	functional	
government214	and	a	loosely	associated	network	of	terror	cells.215	To	deny	the	
detainees	their	protections	defined	in	Additional	Protocol	1	of	the	Geneva	
Conventions,216	the	United	States	argued	that	the	ways	insurgents	fought	inherently	
broke	the	article	stating	that	forces	must	be	identifiable.	Furthermore,	neither	the	
United	States	nor	the	Islamic	Government	of	Afghanistan	had	signed	onto	the	
specific	component	within	the	addendum	to	Protocol	1	that	defined	a	contemporary	
understanding	and	protection	for	insurgents	who	hid	their	identity	on	the	
battlefield.217	The	pre-existing	customary	international	human	rights	law	dictates	
that	states	must	act	as	though	they	are	party	to	this	additional	section,	yet	the	
technically	unenforceable	nature	of	customary	laws	–	international	or	domestic	–	
enables	states	willing	to	weather	international	condemnation	to	ignore	them.	The	
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Americans	assigned	detained	enemy	fighters	the	title	of	“Enemy	Combatant,”218	
arguing	that	the	Taliban	do	not	wear	insignia	identifying	them	as	combatants,219	and	
therefore	engaged	in	perfidy.220	ISAF	and	the	United	States	used	the	new	definition	
of	their	prisoners	to	detain	suspected	Taliban	fighters	within	the	system	of	military	
law,221	but	claimed	to	be	free	from	the	responsibility	of	providing	the	full	host	of	
protections	afforded	to	prisoners	of	war	by	the	Geneva	Conventions	due	to	the	
Taliban’s	perfidy	on	the	battlefield.	The	complex	nature	of	the	definition	for	
captured	insurgents	gets	deeper	if	applied	to	the	stateless	AQ	suspects	captured	in	
Afghanistan	and	around	the	globe.	While	establishing	the	legal	status	of	detained	
Taliban	and	other	non-aligned	insurgents	operating	in	Afghanistan	required	much	
thought,	the	legal	interpretation	of	Al-Qaeda	as	an	international	terrorist	group	
changed	the	conception	of	what	actions	and	legal	protections	were	admissible	or	
required	and	enabled	the	United	States	to	adopt	extreme	measures	when	dealing	
with	this	enemy.		
Counterinsurgency	doctrines	have	historically	been	tied	to	regions	within	
certain	geographic	boundaries.	The	operational	area	of	insurgencies	has	grown	in	
parallel	with	the	technology	available	to	them.	The	French	counterinsurgency	
operations	in	Vendeé	targeted	a	small	region,222	while	during	the	Second	World	
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War,	the	Germans	faced	Soviet	partisans	operating	all	over	the	Eastern	Front,	
including	Poland	and	Slovakia	and	coordinated	via	radio	with	command	echelons.223	
The	difficulty	a	counterinsurgent	faces	in	gathering	information	increases	with	the	
span	and	diversity	of	operational	regions:	in	Vendeé,	French	revolutionaries	had	
encountered	insurgents	with	their	singular	culture	operating	on	the	same	terrain,	
while	German	counterinsurgents	had	to	fight	a	multiethnic	force	well	adapted	to	a	
diverse	terrain,	which	was	a	much	more	difficult	task.	The	American	battles	against	
Al-Qaeda	and	the	Taliban	within	Afghanistan	are	indicative	of	this	exponential	
difficulty	of	intelligence	gathering.	The	United	States	poured	their	
counterinsurgency	efforts	into	a	host	of	arenas	–	the	specific	operational	
environment	of	Afghanistan,	the	international	intelligence-gathering	community,	
and	the	various	domestic	political	situations	of	participating	nations,	among	others	
–	in	addition	to	combating	the	international	threat	posed	by	Al-Qaeda.	The	March	
11th,	2004	Madrid	train	bombings	and	the	July	7th,	2005	terrorist	acts	in	London	
demonstrated	the	range	of	the	threat:	these	were	attacks	conducted	by	international	
terrorists	inspired	or	trained	by	the	jihadist	insurgency.224	The	chronologically	
sensitive	nature	of	terror	attacks	incentivized	torture	by	counter-terrorist	agencies	
–	torture’s	siren	claim	supposed	that	it	could	promptly	deliver	the	intelligence	
necessary	to	avert	terrorist	acts.	The	threat	posed	by	the	insurgency	overcame	
distance	and	geographic	boundaries;	it	became	ever-present	and	enabled	by	both	
information	technology	and	the	emergence	of	lone-wolf	terrorism.		
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The	United	States	faced	a	conundrum	similar	to	the	French	during	the	Battle	
of	Algiers:	a	pressing	need	to	gather	intelligence	from	forces	that	were	hindered	by	
substantial	obstacles	–	language,	culture,	and	behaviour,	all	were	alien	to	Western	
intelligence	services	–	combined	with	preserving	the	position	of	leadership	and	
prestige	held	by	the	United	States.	Despite	the	nominally	shared	nature	of	the	
financial,	technological,	and	personnel	burdens	of	organizations	such	as	Five	Eyes	–	
an	intelligence	sharing	arrangement	comprised	of	the	US,	Canada,	UK,	Australia,	and	
New	Zealand	–	and	NATO	–	the	United	States	maintains	a	leading	role	in	these	
structures	as	it	did	in	ISAF.	Thus,	the	onus	for	gathering	intelligence	and	
disseminating	it	to	allied	forces	fell	mostly	on	the	United	States,	to	the	point	where	
the	allies	handed	off	detainees	to	the	United	States.225	The	establishment	of	an	
entrenched	process	for	transferring	potential	intelligence	sources	is	a	tacit	
acknowledgement	of	the	leadership	role	held	by	the	United	States,	and	a	trust	in	the	
competence	of	their	interrogators	and	subsequent	information	transfers.	This	
leadership	role,	when	combined	with	the	possible	risks	of	failing	to	obtain	necessary	
information,	provoked	a	temptation	to	use	torture,	particularly	when	conventional	
intelligence-gathering	methodology	was	problematic.		
Conventional	intelligence	gathering	involves	infiltration,	monitoring,	and	
establishment	of	local	partnerships;	to	be	successful,	the	program	also	requires	a	
significant	investment	of	time	and	resources,	as	well	as	familiarity	with	local	
customs.	The	United	States	alone,	and	NATO	on	the	whole,	had	not	enough	
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interpreters226	and	not	enough	knowledge	of	the	various	customs	of	Afghanistan’s	
disparate	clans	and	ethnic	groups.227	The	security	situation	as	well	proved	far	too	
mercurial	for	the	development	of	any	major	working	relationships	with	local	
civilians	outside	of	major	towns	such	as	Kandahar	and	Kabul,	where	the	deployment	
of	Coalition	troops	could	provide	sufficient	security	against	the	Taliban.228	Often	the	
various	warlords	corralled	into	helping	to	overthrow	the	Taliban	inflamed	civilian	
dissatisfaction	with	the	anti-Taliban	Coalition	members	as	they	began	to	have	
violent	internal	conflicts,229	and	some	are	reported	to	have	engaged	in	ethnic	
cleansing	near	the	northern	city	of	Mazar-i-Sharif,	which	had	been	conquered	by	the	
Northern	Alliance.230	As	the	feasibility	of	non-invasive	intelligence	gathering	
diminished	through	the	second	year	of	Operation	Enduring	Freedom,	the	American	
intelligence	units	assigned	to	the	counterinsurgency	efforts,	predominantly	the	
CIA,231began	to	introduce	more	extreme	methods	of	interrogation,	as	well	as	the	
transportation	and	seclusion	of	key	detainees	in	the	“Black	Sites.”232	The	name	
“Black	Sites”	refers	to	locations	outside	the	direct	legal	jurisdiction	of	the	United	
States;	they	operate	without	any	governmental	oversight	and	their	contents	and	the	
actions	taken	within	are	classified	as	top	secret.	The	transfer	of	prisoners	to	these	
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facilities	located	outside	of	US	jurisdiction	in	states	willing	to	turn	a	blind	eye	to	
torture	began	as	early	as	December	2002.233	Intelligence-gathering	efforts	outside	of	
the	proto-EIT	procedure,	then	known	as	“Rendition,	Detention,	and	Interrogation”	
(RDI),234	were	construed	as	too	time	consuming,235	and	in	conjunction	with	the	
American	exposure	to	torture	via	the	ANA	and	ANP,	the	incentive	to	practise	such	
heavy-handed	techniques	under	American	interrogators	increased	dramatically.236		
The	belief	was	that	torture	had	the	capacity	to	deliver	actionable	intelligence	
rapidly	–	similar	to	the	French	belief	in	Algeria	–	yet	without	the	need	to	engage	in	
foundational	pre-interrogation	case-building	that	enabled	conventional	
interrogation	techniques	such	as	GRIMACE237	and	PEACE,238	which	use	previously	
obtained	evidence	to	direct	and	guide	questioning.	Reliance	on	torture	induced	a	
psychological	condition	in	the	interrogators239	that	was	known	as	“guilt-
presumptive”	interrogation.	Effectively,	in	the	minds	of	the	interrogators	their	
prisoners	were	both	guilty	and	purposely	withholding	information,	which	
dramatically	increased	the	likelihood	of	torture.240	The	presumption	that	every	
individual	detained	and	placed	before	the	interrogator	was	guilty	had	ruinous	
effects	during	the	French	campaign	in	Algeria,	when	the	French	interrogators	
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tortured	to	death	many	Algerians.241	A	similar	pathology	presented	itself	in	
Afghanistan,	as	reports	about	prisoners	whom	Canada	had	handed	over	to	American	
intelligence	agencies	and	who	then	vanished	without	a	trace	grew	in	number.242	It	is	
reasonable	to	assume	that	in	parallel	with	France’s	practice	in	Algeria,	the	United	
States	also	found	itself	disposing	of	the	bodies	of	torture	victims.243		
Intelligence	forces	had	torture	as	a	tool,	and	they	became	familiar	with	its	
application	during	the	initial	campaign	in	Afghanistan.	The	experience	obtained	
established	the	practice	within	the	intelligence-gathering	apparatus.	After	the	
invasion	of	Iraq,	and	the	introduction	and	wholesale	adoption	of	EIT	by	the	CIA	for	
high-value	targets,	Afghanistan	also	received	elements	of	the	EIT	program.	Bagram	
Airbase	had	a	detention	facility	used	by	American	personnel	for	torture,	although	
they	shut	it	down	after	it	attracted	international	attention.	In	an	ironic	twist,	a	
soldier	charged	in	the	US	Army	investigation	into	the	allegations	of	torture	at	the	
Bagram	facility,	Specialist	Damien	Corsetti,	was	later	assigned	to	Abu	Ghraib	after	
being	cleared	of	all	charges,	and	again	engaged	in	torture	there.244	The	lack	of	a	
concrete	and	lasting	legal	punishment	for	those	involved	in	the	torture	of	captives,	
for	leisure	or	for	intelligence	gathering,	indicates	a	laxity	within	the	United	States	
Military	Judiciary;	this	laxity	came	back	to	haunt	and	cripple	the	entire	US	
counterinsurgency	effort.	
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Enhanced	interrogation	techniques,	and	their	first	victim,	Abu	Zubaydah,245	
were	in	place	before	the	invasion	of	Iraq.	The	investigation	into	the	EIT	program	
discovered	US-government	memos	and	communiqués	affirming	the	list	of	
aggressive	interrogation	techniques	from	2002.246	The	government	cited	
Zubaydah’s	testimony,	which	was	retrieved	under	torture,	to	justify	the	invasion	of	
Iraq.	This	practice	thus	predated	the	Abu	Ghraib	incident	and	the	commonly	
understood	start	of	the	EIT	program.	CIA	and	FBI	reports	on	the	interrogation	of	
Zubaydah	confirm	the	use	of	EIT,	yet	Ali	Soufan	–	the	FBI	agent	attached	as	an	
interrogator	–	stated	that	traditional	case-building	interrogation	delivered	the	same	
actionable	intelligence	at	the	same	time	scale	as	EIT;247	Soufan	also	testified	that	the	
actions	of	the	CIA	constituted	torture.248	Retaining	personnel	familiar	with	torture	
and	transferring	them	to	Iraq	after	the	invasion	was	not	the	only	flotsam	carried	to	
the	new	campaign.	The	policies	developed	in	Afghanistan	presented	the	playbook	
for	both	solving	uncomfortable	legal	conundrums	and	obtaining	the	information	
believed	to	be	necessary	for	counterinsurgency	operations.	The	CIA	advanced	RDI	
into	Iraq	with	a	new	name	and	fresh	legal	protections	–	Enhanced	Interrogation	
Techniques.		
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Chapter	4:	Iraq	(2003-Present	Day):	Broken	Bodies	and	Doomed	Campaigns	
The	Neo-Conservative	desire	and	initiatives	to	install	democracy	in	various	
oil-rich	Middle	Eastern	countries	were	intended	to	solve	various	social	ills,	thus	
turning	these	countries	into	rational	partners	on	the	global	stage.	However,	these	
ideologically	charged	objectives	blinded	the	Bush	administration	to	the	
consequences	of	the	Global	War	on	Terror	and	their	effect	on	the	counterinsurgency	
mission	on	the	ground	in	Iraq.	The	first	major	failure	of	Neo-Conservative	thinking	
with	regard	to	the	environment	that	American	forces	would	be	operating	in	post-
Saddam	Iraq	was	the	assumption	that	all	populations	naturally	trend	toward	
democratic	function.249	Groups	of	selfish	Iraqi	exiles	contracted	by	the	US	
government	reinforced	the	assertion	that	Iraq	would	welcome	the	American	
invasion.250	The	belief	that	the	various	Iraqi	ethnic	groups	and	their	political	actors	
with	different	historic	understandings	and	cultural	practices	would	desire	a	
Western-style	democracy,	allegedly	an	ideal	template	for	all	peoples,	was	at	best	
ignorant	or,	for	Iraq,	destructive.251	The	US	strategy	dictated	by	ideology	decreased	
the	likelihood	of	a	successful	transition	from	Saddam	Hussein’s	dictatorship	to	a	
better	future	for	Iraq.252	The	fog	of	ideology	resulted	in	the	failure	of	the	
counterinsurgency	effort	in	Iraq,	and	the	ultimate	adoption	of	torture	as	an	
interrogation	method.	
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The	US	strategists	have	held	up	the	victory	against	Iraq	in	the	First	Gulf	War,	
with	technological	advancements	and	the	overwhelming	force	enjoyed	by	the	
Americans,253	as	the	proof	required	for	dispensing	with	numerically	large	militaries	
built	up	during	the	Cold	War.	However,	the	removal	of	these	large	infantry	
formations	reduced	the	capability	to	hold	ground.254	The	ability	to	access	local	
intelligence	networks	relies	on	the	visible	presence	of	an	occupier	who	protects	the	
civilian	population	from	retaliation	by	insurgents.	The	United	States	started	its	
counterinsurgency	campaign	in	Iraq	with	a	numerically	handicapped	force,	and	with	
a	doctrine	that	overemphasized	technological	capacity	but	neglected	to	take	control	
of	the	territory	and	its	population.255	Counterinsurgents	who	cannot	provide	
continuing	security,	reconstruction,	and	social	support	will	have	these	
responsibilities	subverted	and	overtaken	by	the	insurgency.	The	RMA	theory's	
predetermined	strategic	deployment	mechanism	resulted	in	a	woefully	inadequate	
number	of	soldiers	being	sent	to	Iraq.	
	By	destroying	Iraq’s	already	strained	infrastructure,	the	United	States	
squandered	the	good	will	of	the	Iraqi	people	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	a	
successful	invasion.256	Some	Iraqis	preferred	the	inevitable,	though	assumed	
temporary,	chaos	of	the	American	intervention	to	bring	an	end	to	the	previous	
government.	Saddam	Hussein	was	a	brutal	dictator,	and	although	estimates	of	the	
exact	timeline	of	friendly	dispositions	toward	American	intervention	varies,257	most	
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have	the	window	of	American	opportunity	pegged	between	three	weeks	to	two	
months,	post	capitulation.258	Having	an	accommodating	population	and	a	
disorganized	official	opposition	should	have	made	the	American	counterinsurgency	
mission	simple	to	carry	out;	the	happy	population	being	more	likely	to	cooperate,	
and	thus	less	likely	to	support	or	join	an	insurgency.		
The	American	intelligence	community	and	policymakers	demonstrated	their	
cultural	ignorance	when	they	completely	overlooked	the	role	the	Iraqi	Army	played	
as	a	uniting	force	for	the	disparate	ethnic	groups	within	Iraq.	Iraq’s	religious	and	
ethnic	groups	–	Sunni	and	Shia	Muslims,	Yazidis,	and	Christians	from	any	one	of	
dozens	of	backgrounds,	be	they	Arab,	Kurdish,	Turkish,	or	even	African	Arabs259	–	
are	deeply	suspicious	of	one	another.	While	the	civil	and	social	sphere	of	pre-
invasion	Iraq	was	fraught	with	ethnic	tensions,	the	Iraqi	military	acted	as	a	form	of	
social	leveler.260	Recruits	from	the	various	religious	and	ethnic	groups	lived	
together	as	members	of	a	secular	institution	separated	from	the	interests	of	any	one	
group,	and	singularly	focused	on	the	survival	of	the	state	as	a	whole.	Disbanding	the	
military	caused	an	unmanageable	growth	of	sectarianism.	Various	ethnic	groups	
armed	themselves	and	formed	militias	that	could	either	protect	their	specific	group	
from	territorial	or	genocidal	predations	of	others,	or	attack	their	rivals.	Dissolution	
of	the	Iraqi	Army	supercharged	the	inexperienced	militias,	with	trained	soldiers	
deserting	their	bases,	taking	arms	and	comrades	with	them.	These	soldiers,	
traumatized	by	the	defeat	suffered	by	Iraq,	and	its	occupation	by	foreign	powers,	
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had	now	also	lost	their	employment	and	income.	Thousands	of	disgruntled	ex-
servicemen	formed	the	core	of	the	resistance,	providing	it	with	trained	troops,	
weapons,	and	explosives,	while	the	population	was	arming	itself	out	of	fear	of	ethnic	
and	religious	rivals,	and	against	their	perceived	common	enemy:	the	United	States	
and	the	other	members	of	the	“Coalition	of	the	Willing.”	The	egregious	missteps	the	
United	States	committed	during	the	preliminary	planning	of	the	invasion	of	Iraq,	as	
well	as	the	courses	taken	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	seizing	power	from	the	
Ba’ath	Party,	had	created	favourable	conditions	for	the	rapid	rise	of	insurgency.	
The	American-made	chaos	impacting	the	counterinsurgents’	ability	to	access	
or	cultivate	local	assets	for	information	on	the	growing	insurgency	was	fated	to	
force	them	to	pursue	extreme	measures.	Gathering	information	from	groups	
ostensibly	sponsored	by	the	American-aligned	government,261	such	as	the	Sons	of	
Iraq	militia	group,262	proved	to	be	difficult	as	the	militiamen’s	cooperation	with	
American	intelligence	was	at	the	whim	of	the	individual	or	the	individual’s	bribe	
price.	The	viewpoint	that	conflated	the	nominally	nationalist	resistance	with	the	
global	phenomena	of	Al-Qaeda263	further	impeded	American	intelligence	gathering	
in	Iraq.	The	Bush	administration’s	preoccupation	with	proving	pre-existing	links	
between	the	government	of	Saddam	Hussein	and	Al-Qaeda	diverted	critical	
intelligence	capacity	away	from	fighting	the	insurgency.	The	initial	construing	of	
Saddam	Hussein	as	an	ally	or	assistant	to	Al-Qaeda	by	the	Bush	Administration264	
had	been	proven	wrong	by	the	historic	inability	of	AQ	to	infiltrate	the	tightly	
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controlled	Saddam	Iraq.265	This	self-fulfilling	assumption	undermined	the	American	
capacity	to	actually	redress	the	problems	driving	Iraqis	into	the	insurgency.	In	truth,	
only	several	months	after	the	beginning	of	the	American	occupation	of	Iraq	did	Al-
Qaeda	infiltrate	and	cross	unguarded	borders	and	cooperate	with	aggrieved	local	
Iraqis	desperate	to	regain	control	over	their	nation.	
The	Americans	had	to	redeploy	their	forces	from	Afghanistan	into	Iraq	as	the	
insurgency	grew	exponentially.	Troops	were	not	the	only	asset	transported	from	
Afghanistan,	however,	as	the	legal	definitions	of	the	insurgents,	the	legality	and	
protections	afforded	to	them,	and	the	interrogation	methods	and	extraordinary	
rendition	came	with	them	as	well.	Socio-cultural	ignorance	is	a	common	issue	for	
foreign	counterinsurgents,	as	they	inherently	lack	familiarity	with	the	minutiae	of	
local	cultural	customs.	Seemingly	innocent	gestures,	such	as	how	to	shake	hands,	
what	must	be	done	upon	entering	someone’s	home,	how	to	address	elders,	who	
must	be	spoken	to	first,	and	hundreds	of	other	scenarios	are	part	of	cultural	
awareness.	Having	a	functional	understanding	of	cultural	differences	can	build	
inroads	and	connections	to	communities	and	build	opposition	for	the	insurgency.266	
The	“Coalition	of	the	Willing”	was	ignorant	of	such	differences.	As	the	United	States	
and	its	allies	sent	reinforcements	to	Iraq,267	so	too	did	Al-Qaeda	send	its	most	
capable	terrorists	and	insurgent	commanders	abroad	to	drum	up	additional	
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recruits,	funding,	and	weapons.268	The	rise	of	Al-Qaeda	in	Iraq269	would	have	been	
impossible	without	the	invasion	of	Iraq	that	provoked	the	backlash	from	the	Islamic	
world.270		
The	United	States	found	itself	unable	to	acquire	actionable	intelligence	for	
operations	against	the	Iraqi	insurgency,	let	alone	the	broader	global	integration	of	
terror	networks	and	affiliated	insurgent	groups.	Of	particular	concern	to	American	
planners	was	the	effective	deployment	of	small	numbers	of	American	troops	on	the	
ground.	Due	to	the	dominant	position	of	RMA	theory	in	American	strategic	planning,	
American	forces	were	far	better	suited	to	precision	attacks	on	insurgent	strongholds	
or	key	targets,	and	less	suited	to	operating	as	a	static	presence	in	Iraqi	
neighbourhoods	and	patrolling	for	insurgents.	The	few	instances	of	semi-
conventional	combat,	such	as	the	Second	Battle	of	Fallujah,271	saw	clear	American	
victories	over	the	insurgents	due	to	their	technological	superiority,	yet	the	
campaign	against	the	Iraqi	rebels	rarely	gave	the	US	forces	these	sorts	of	
opportunities.	Intelligence	acquired	on	the	insurgency	was	critical	for	enabling	RMA	
strategies	such	as	precision	raids	and	drone	attacks.	Yet,	intelligence-gathering	
operations	in	the	hostile	Iraqi	environment	failed	to	produce	a	sufficient	quantity	of	
information,	which	paralyzed	American	counterinsurgency	efforts.	Strategic	
personnel	limitations,	dictated	by	RMA,	prevented	the	counterinsurgents	from	
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swapping	out	counterinsurgency	doctrines	that	could	cultivate	integral	bilateral	
relationships	within	the	Iraqi	civilian	populace.	In	response,	key	military	personnel,	
such	as	General	David	Petraeus,272	pushed	strategic	planners	for	a	troop	surge	in	
Iraq	that	would	also	open	up	opportunities	for	conventional	intelligence	gathering.	
The	surge	would	increase	the	security	and	thus	facilitate	Iraqi	civil	development,	
which	in	turn	would	expand	the	cooperation	of	the	Iraqi	populace	for	intelligence	
purposes.	
Pressure	to	make	progress	against	the	insurgency,	however,	did	not	wait	for	
the	troop	surge	of	2007.	American-dominated	counterinsurgents	needed	solutions	
on	the	battlefield	immediately,	which,	when	combined	with	the	legal	definitions	for	
the	Iraqi	insurgency	imported	from	Afghanistan,273	incentivized	mass	detention	and	
the	use	of	Enhanced	Interrogation	Techniques.274	Pressure	to	use	EIT	originated	
with	the	Bush	administration’s	civil	and	legal	advisory	groups,275	as	well	as	within	
the	Central	Intelligence	Agency.276	Key	American	legal	advisors,	such	as	Attorney	
General	Alberto	Gonzales,277	believed	that	the	information	generated	from	applying	
torture	led	to	positive	outcomes.	The	infamous	“Torture	Memos,”	signed	by	
Gonzales	and	drafted	by	John	Yoo,	were	in	response	to	the	conundrum	of	how	far	
the	United	States	could	go	when	dealing	with	Abu	Zubaydah.278	Yoo’s	perception	of	
the	American	executive	branch’s	power	dictated	the	effectual	circumvention	of	
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congressional	oversight	in	law	making;279	in	Yoo’s	opinion,	“customary280	
international	law	is	not	federal	law	and	…	the	president	is	free	to	override	it	at	his	
discretion.”281	This	was	an	extremely	liberal	interpretation	of	the	UNCAT.	
Principally,	communications	between	the	CIA	and	the	Bush	administration	
contained	directions	for	the	relocation	of	Zubaydah,	recommendations	on	the	use	of	
torture,	and	approval	from	the	Attorney	General	to	use	waterboarding,	among	other	
Enhanced	Interrogation	Techniques.282	These	memos,	and	the	legal	advisors	for	the	
Bush	administration,	heavily	influenced	the	decisions	to	introduce	and	deploy	EIT,	
as	well	as	the	decision	to	base	the	acts	of	interrogation	themselves	outside	of	the	
United	States,	in	areas	such	as	Guantanamo	Bay	or	the	global	array	of	Black	Sites.		
The	United	Kingdom	also	engaged	in	a	form	of	physical	interrogation	
inspired	in	many	ways	by	the	American	Enhanced	Interrogation	program.	
Differentiating	the	United	Kingdom	from	the	United	States	was	the	absence	of	pro-
torture	members	of	the	legislature,	and	the	kind	of	legal	advisors	within	the	
executive	that	plagued	the	United	States	during	the	creation	of	EIT.	When	British	
operations	in	Basra	bogged	down	without	actionable	information,	the	British	
employed	their	form	of	extreme	physical	interrogation	methods,	and	this	came	as	
early	as	September	2003,283	when	Baha	Mousa’s	death	at	the	Temporary	Detention	
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Facility,	a	prison	established	within	the	British	zone	of	control	in	Basra,	entered	the	
international	media	cycle.	Many	of	the	techniques	used	by	the	British	military	
interrogators	mirror	the	CIA’s	own	textbook	of	EIT	methods,	with	the	most	
prominent	technique	being	the	use	of	stress	positions	over	long	periods.284	A	critical	
distinction,	however,	and	the	saving	grace	for	the	British	in	terms	of	avoiding	
international	and	domestic	condemnation,	was	the	limited	scope	and	employment	
of	these	harsher	interrogation	methods.	The	British	catalogued	and	detailed	their	
methods,	and	unlike	the	American	interrogators	who	resorted	to	regular	
waterboarding	and	beatings,	the	British	stopped	at	stress	positions	and	minor	
deprivation.285	While	the	use	of	physical	interrogation	methods	damaged	the	Tony	
Blair	government's	reputation,	the	clear	definition,	tracking,	and	hard	end	point	of	
what	would	be	acceptable	helped	to	defend	and	legitimize	the	British	military’s	use	
of	physical	interrogation.	
The	desperate	need	for	actionable	intelligence	meant	employing	familiar	
tools	and	skills	gained	during	harsh	interrogations	in	Afghanistan.	This	would	prove	
to	be	a	fundamental	misstep	of	its	own,	but	combined	with	the	dissolving	of	the	
Iraqi	Army,	and	American	cultural	blindness,	the	step	led	to	a	dark	place.	American	
decision-making	had	already	been	deeply	compromised	in	Iraq,	as	the	dissolution	of	
its	military	and	abject	ignorance	of	the	major	ethno-religious	divides	in	the	region	
illustrates,	but	the	employment	of	torture	paved	the	way	to	disaster.286	The	torture	
of	suspects	by	Americans	within	Hussein’s	infamous	prison	already	known	for	the	
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use	of	torture	compounded	the	destruction	of	American	legitimacy	in	the	eyes	of	the	
Iraqi	people,	who	were	already	facing	massive	deprivations	as	a	result	of	prolonged	
chaos	resulting	from	the	invasion	and	smashed	civil	infrastructure.287	The	tortures	
and	abuses	within	Abu	Ghraib,	however,	were	bound	to	enrage	and	enflame	the	
Islamic	world.	Women,	who	were	treated	as	chattel	by	fundamentalist	Islamist	
regimes	at	worst,288	and	as	second-class	citizens	at	best,289	were	the	most	
prominent	torturers	at	Abu	Ghraib.	In	societies	where,	despite	the	hot	climate,	men	
cannot	even	wear	shorts,290	and	women	must	wear	veils	or	other	clothing	that	
completely	covers	all	their	skin,291	photos	of	private	first	class	Lynndie	England	
posing	with	stacks	of	naked	men292	or	leading	a	naked	man	around	on	a	leash	like	a	
dog,	which	Islam	sees	as	a	dirty	and	impure	animal,	ignited	an	explosion	of	anger.	
The	outrage	provoked	by	this	public	relations	disaster	destabilized	relations	with	
Islamic	nations	such	as	Saudi	Arabia	and	Pakistan,	nations	that	the	United	States	
relied	on	in	their	counterinsurgency	campaign.293	Further	acts,	such	as	the	forced	
feeding	of	pork	–	the	eating	of	pork	is	banned	in	Islam	as	the	pig	is	considered	to	be	
a	dirty	animal	–	to	Islamic	inmates,	rape	and	other	forced	sexual	acts,	and	the	
general	physical	abuse	levied	on	the	prisoners	of	Abu	Ghraib	completely	eviscerated	
the	previously	enjoyed	capacity	of	the	United	States	to	act	as	a	leader	in	global	
morality.	The	use	of	EIT	would	have	proven	disastrous	even	without	the	seemingly	
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purposeful	insults	levied	against	Islam.	Their	having	spit,	intentionally	or	not,	upon	
several	core	tenets	of	Islam	has	caused	a	torrent	of	Islamic	hatred	toward	the	United	
States,	and	a	greater	problem	still	for	the	counterinsurgency	campaign	in	Iraq,294	
and	this	impact	continues	to	be	an	obstacle	for	the	Global	War	on	Terror.	
The	collapse	of	American	soft	power,	and	the	effective	surrender	of	their	
moral	high	ground,	legitimized	the	Iraqi	insurgency	and	played	directly	into	the	
propaganda	metanarrative	constructed	by	Al-Qaeda.295	Al-Qaeda	had	claimed	for	
nearly	a	decade	that	the	Western	Crusaders	were	directly	attacking	Muslims	and	
taking	away	their	lands.296	The	invasion	of	Iraq	gave	merit	to	this	argument,	and	the	
revelations	about	Abu	Ghraib	vindicated	the	Islamist	cause	for	many	Muslims.	
Analyses	of	Al-Qaeda	membership	illustrate	the	disastrous	impact	the	invasion	of	
Iraq	had	on	American	efforts	to	curtail	international	terrorism,	with	jihadist	
manpower	increasing	dramatically	after	the	invasion.297	Torture	and	Abu	Ghraib	
also	completely	undercut	the	American	capacity	to	convincingly	present	Western	
democracy	as	a	shining	alternative	to	the	populations	of	both	Iraq	and	Afghanistan,	
while	destroying	the	international	prestige	of	the	invaders	as	non-Western	media	
and	the	insurgents’	own	public	relations	mechanisms	constantly	publicized	and	
replayed	their	human	rights	abuses.	The	revelations	of	torture	for	information	
gathering	in	Iraq,	Afghanistan,	and	around	the	globe	nullified	the	majority	of	
successes	in	the	Global	War	on	Terror.	The	exposure	of	torture	weakened	
international	Coalition-fighting	of	global	terrorism,	as	well	as	the	credibility	of	
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governments	established	by	the	Coalition	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan.	The	flames	of	
insurgency	grew	into	an	inferno	both	in	and	outside	Iraq.	The	admission	of	the	
existence	of	an	international	network	of	CIA	Black	Sites,	located	in	cooperating	
states	such	as	Poland	and	Romania,	where	legal	interpretation	and	jurisdiction	
shielded	American	actions,298	caused	domestic	unrest	in	those	countries.299	This	
also	helped	to	fuel	the	birth	of	new	Al-Qaeda–inspired	affiliates	around	the	globe,	
including	Syria,	Sudan,	Somalia,	Yemen,	Nigeria,	and	Kashmir.	Within	Iraq,	the	ranks	
of	the	insurgency	grew,	while	cooperation	between	the	United	States	and	the	new	
Iraqi	government	broke	down	further.	It	became	close	to	impossible	to	regain	the	
moral	high	ground	or	positive	perception	of	counterinsurgency	after	the	crippling	
consequences	of	torture	incidents	–	both	proven	and	alleged.		
Within	Iraq,	the	insurgency	exploded	in	size	after	Abu	Ghraib.	Most	of	the	
insurgents	were	Sunni	Muslims.	The	Sunnis	dominate	in	the	Middle	East,	with	key	
holdings	in	Saudi	Arabia,	Jordan,	Egypt,	and,	most	notably	for	the	farthest-reaching	
consequences	of	the	American	use	of	torture	in	Abu	Ghraib	and	around	the	world,	
Syria.300	After	the	revelations	of	torture,	Sunnis	from	all	around	the	Middle	East	
flocked	to	the	cause	of	the	Iraqi	insurgency,	though	the	impetus	for	many	was	not	
the	defeat	of	Coalition	forces	and	control	of	the	government	by	their	preferred	clan	
or	religious	group,	but	purely	anti-Western	sentiment.	The	insurgency	grew	into	a	
force	with	territorial	ambitions	beyond	the	Iraqi	borders,	and	what	would	become	
known	as	the	Islamic	State	in	Iraq	and	Syria	(ISIS),	Daesh,	or	the	Islamic	State	in	Iraq	
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and	the	Levant	(ISIL),	gestated	within	the	incensed	multinational	Sunni	insurgency	
within	Iraq.301	Well	before	the	Islamic	state,	however,	the	community	of	Muslim	
nations	around	Iraq	fed	equipment,	men,	and	money	into	the	insurgency.	By	
attempting	to	remedy	the	intelligence	shortages	in	Iraq	with	torture,	the	United	
States	only	further	radicalized	and	empowered	the	insurgency.	Failing	to	generate	
any	information	leading	to	operational	advancement	or	success,	while	accelerating	
the	deaths	of	American	servicemen,	torture	did	nothing	to	limit	or	interrupt	the	
globally	integrated	IED	manufacturing	networks,	the	deadliest	weapon	of	the	
insurgents	Only	steady	traditional	infiltration,	case	building,	and	an	analysis	of	
origin	points	and	possible	sources	of	bomb	making	parts	and	expertise	carried	out	
by	American	intelligence	operatives	would	help	in	solving	this	problem.302	Torture	
actively	undermined	the	efforts	of	traditional	intelligence-gathering	operations,	as	
the	necessary	interpersonal	relationships	between	intelligence	agents	and	their	
contacts	within	organizations	like	Al-Qaeda	was	crippled	by	American	actions	at	
Abu	Ghraib.	
The	revelations	about	torture	had	a	profound	effect	on	the	American	
domestic	public	and	their	support	for	continuing	operations	in	the	Middle	East.	
Retention	of	domestic	support	for	the	intervening	counterinsurgent	is	a	necessity	
for	the	continuation	and	success	of	any	pacification	campaign.	It	is	difficult	to	
maintain	the	momentum	of	public	approval	for	the	intervention	or	
counterinsurgency	campaign	in	contemporary	conflicts	because	social	media	
																																																								
301	Liz	Sly,	“The	Islamic	State	Has	Been	a	Catastrophe	for	Sunnis,”	Washington	Post,	November	23,	
2016.	
302	Ibid.,	194-97.	
	
	 69	
enables	insurgents	to	create	their	own	media	fronts	by	spreading	disinformation	or	
notifying	the	world	of	counterinsurgent	missteps.	The	American	invasion	of	Iraq	
enjoyed	a	71	percent	approval	rating	among	the	domestic	population	in	March	
2003,303	even	without	a	sanction	from	the	United	Nations	for	the	invasion,	and	in	
the	face	of	criticism	and	condemnation	from	the	international	community.304	Having	
what	was	ostensibly	three-quarters	of	the	American	population	in	support	of	the	
invasion,	the	United	States	could	act	with	a	free	hand	in	the	pursuit	of	the	continuing	
counterinsurgency	campaign	within	Iraq	and	Afghanistan.	Yet	opposition	did	exist	
within	the	United	States,	as	anti-Bush305	and	anti-war	sentiment	were	a	constant	
presence	in	the	public	domain.	The	largest	demonstrations	occurred	after	the	start	
of	the	Iraqi	insurgency,	as	fatalities	among	the	American	forces	grew,	and	after	Abu	
Ghraib.	Abu	Ghraib	itself	should	have	torn	down	the	columns	of	support	as	coverage	
of	the	abuses	and	subsequent	scandal	broke	in	April	2004,306	and	yet	public	opinion	
polls	indicated	that	a	majority	of	Americans	did	approve	of	torture	under	the	
condition	that	it	would	“thwart	a	terrorist	attack.”307	Individually	and	by	faction,	the	
United	States	public	never	rose	above	40	percent	approval	directly	for	torture,308	
yet	the	Bush	administration	relied	on	crafted	polling	questions	referring	to	a	simple	
situation	with	an	unquestionably	guilty	subject.	The	questions	implied	the	
effectiveness	of	torture,	thus	sidestepping	the	opportunity	to	question	or	oppose	the	
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CIA	and	the	Bush	government’s	central	justification	for	the	use	of	Enhanced	
Interrogation,	and	that	it	offered	access	to	information	that	was	otherwise	
unobtainable.	Popular	support	for	the	invasion	of	Iraq	plummeted	from	a	high	of	
80	percent	just	after	the	invasion,	down	to	39	percent	in	late	June	2004,309	months	
away	from	the	next	election,	and	only	one	year	into	the	occupation.	Aggregate	
polling	from	2001	to	2009	indicates	that	54.16	percent	of	Americans	oppose	the	use	
of	torture,	while	41.68	percent	support	it.	Marines	and	Army	soldiers	serving	in	Iraq	
in	2006	also	displayed	similar	levels	of	opposition	to	torture,	both	for	gathering	
information	and,	surprisingly,	even	if	the	torture	would	save	the	life	of	a	fellow	
soldier	or	Marine.310	It	should	be	noted	that	the	high	of	2004	was	only	a	55	percent	
approval	rating,	indicating	that	the	honeymoon	period	that	had	swept	the	Bush	
administration	through	the	early	days	of	Iraq	was	firmly	over.	Yet	in	a	key	shift	from	
the	French	experience	with	torture’s	impact	on	domestic	politics,	the	American	
Republic	not	only	forged	ahead,	but	the	Bush	administration	secured	the	popular	
vote	and	won	the	overall	election	in	November	2004.	While	the	American	electoral	
system	does	not	require	the	popular	vote,	as	the	electoral	college’s	role	is	to	
specifically	prevent	the	dominance	of	large	population	centers,	Bush’s	re-election	
with	a	slim	popular	majority	as	well	as	the	electoral	college	vote	implied	that	Bush	
and	his	choices	enjoyed	the	support	of	the	American	people.	Despite	the	collapse	of	
public	opinion,	despite	the	revelations	about	Abu	Ghraib,	despite	popular	
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disapproval	of	torture	and	the	invasion	of	Iraq,	the	Bush	administration	received	
approval	to	continue	governing.	
The	American	invasion	of	Iraq,	conducted	under	ramshackle	legal	
justifications,	without	proper	study	of	the	intended	operational	theatre	and	
hampered	by	the	Neo-Conservative	ideology,	the	hyper-focus	on	a	conventional	war	
expressed	via	RMA	fixation,	as	well	as	total	disregard	of	the	limited	experience	
already	gained	in	Afghanistan,	would	have	made	the	attainment	of	success	against	
the	Iraqi	insurgents	improbable	regardless	of	other	circumstances.	However,	it	was	
not	this	list	of	challenges	that	killed	any	chance	of	achieving	stability	in	Iraq	or	the	
defeat	of	global	Islamic	terrorism	and	what	has	ruined	any	chance	of	a	successful	
end	to	the	Global	War	on	Terror;	it	was	the	use	of	torture	against	the	Iraqi	
insurgency.	Systemic	torture	for	information	in	a	counterinsurgency	campaign	
dooms	any	democratic	state	that	seeks	to	cut	corners	in	intelligence	acquisition.	The	
American	policy	makers	sacrificed	the	moral	high	ground	and	US	international	
prestige	in	favour	of	the	EIT,	and	completely	ignored	basic	human	rights,	thus	
handing	victory	to	whatever	spinoff	of	Al-Qaeda	rears	its	head.	The	United	States	
continues	to	engage	in	armed	conflict	against	Al-Qaeda	affiliates,	or	groups	directly	
spawned	by	its	missteps	in	the	Middle	East,	especially	in	Iraq.	It	is	likely	that	the	day	
Abu	Ghraib	and	the	extent	of	the	EIT	program	came	to	light	will	be	determined	as	
the	beginning	of	the	end	for	the	American	counterinsurgency	effort	in	Iraq	and	
Afghanistan,	as	both	the	Taliban	and	the	Iraqi	insurgents	received	massive	boosts	to	
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funding	and	recruitment	in	the	aftermath.311	Whereas	it	may	have	required	a	
miracle	before	EIT	to	have	the	United	States	gain	victory	in	the	Global	War	on	
Terror,	there	is	nothing	that	can	help	them	now.
																																																								
311	Tan,	81.	
	
	 73	
Conclusion:	Tortured	Outcomes	
	
Counterinsurgency	is	an	inherently	dirty	and	bloody	form	of	warfare.	T.E.	
Lawrence	equated	successful	counterinsurgency	profoundly	to	“learning	to	eat	soup	
with	a	knife.”312	Torture	is	a	choice	made	by	a	counterinsurgent,	and	understanding	
the	motivation	that	compels	torture	means	comprehending	the	desperation	of	the	
actors	in	the	conflict.	The	need	to	rapidly	defeat	the	insurgency	incentivizes	the	
pursuit	of	drastic	action	by	the	counterinsurgent;	the	need	to	stabilize	the	lives	of	
civilians	compels	the	application	of	counterproductive	brutality.	Mai	Lai	in	Vietnam,	
the	Rat	Hunts	of	Algeria,	and	Haditha	in	Iraq	all	illustrate	the	willful	acts	of	violence	
that	plague	a	counterinsurgent’s	efforts	to	better	the	lives	of	those	they	are	
occupying.	Yet	what	differentiates	these	horrific	incidents,	from	those	that	will	
forever	cripple	a	counterinsurgency	campaign,	is	that	they	are	by	their	nature	
spontaneous.	The	perpetrators	of	an	individual	willful	act	can	be	punished;	the	rules	
of	engagement	amended;	visible	remedies	can	be	applied	to	restore	confidence	of	
both	the	host	nation’s	populace,	and	of	the	domestic	audience	that	such	sickening	
acts	of	brutality	will	not	occur	again,	and	certainly	not	without	punishment.	The	
poor	judgment	or	rage	of	an	individual	is	damaging,	but	institutionally	sanctioned	
horrors	are	permanently	crippling;	the	damage	done	by	institutionalized	torture	
cannot	be	undone.	Torture	incidents	occur	in	most	counterinsurgency	campaigns.	If	
those	incidents	are	random,	they	can	be	explained	as	the	momentary	insanity	or	
sadism	of	a	single	individual.	However,	when	this	is	an	institutionalized	policy,	it	
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speaks	to	moral	abdication	and	debased	government-sanctioned	policy.	This	
practice	involves	conscious	and	mass	violations	of	laws;313	masterful	legal	
justifications	do	nothing	to	unseat	the	perception	that	those	who	employ	torture	
have	no	respect	for	the	basic	rights	of	a	human	being,	nor	the	desire	to	improve	the	
situation	of	those	they	ostensibly	are	operating	to	protect.	If	counterinsurgency	
were	a	game,	the	only	proper	move	after	using	torture	would	be	to	cease	playing.	
There	is	no	realistic	way	to	win	a	modern	counterinsurgency	campaign	conducted	
by	a	democracy	after	employing	torture.	The	domestic	support	collapses,	while	the	
hearts	and	minds	of	the	population	targeted	by	the	counterinsurgents	become	
unreachable.	The	revelations	of	torture	in	Algeria	shook	the	French	government	and	
public	to	the	extent	that	they	opted	to	forfeit	the	land	perceived	as	an	integral	part	
of	France	despite	the	impressive	tactical	victories	it	delivered.	Torture	in	
Afghanistan	by	American	and	Afghan	troops	alienated	Afghans,	and	the	ultimate	
failure	in	Iraq	evaporated	the	enormous	initial	international	support	for	America’s	
Global	War	on	Terror,	while	reviving	the	organization	responsible	for	the	attacks	on	
9/11.		
The	effectiveness	of	traditional	intelligence	gathering,	tools	such	as	
questioning,	case	building,	observation	and	infiltration	undercut	any	alleged	
increase	in	the	volume	and	speed	of	intelligence	gathered	by	torture.	EIT	failed	to	
deliver	information	faster	than	traditional	interrogation	methods	when	used	against	
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the	Al-Qaeda	member	Abu	Zubaydah,314	and	has	often	delivered	false	intelligence.	
The	tortured	often	say	or	agree	to	anything	to	make	the	pain	and	suffering	stop,	as	
seen	in	the	false	information	invented	by	Khalid	Sheik	Muhammad	after	he	had	no	
real	information	left	to	give.315	The	arguments	of	some	proponents	of	torture,	who	
believe	that	legalizing	and	incorporating	it	into	the	inventory	of	techniques	for	
interrogators,	disregard	the	realities	of	domestic	and	international	law.	Torture	is	
not	a	golden	key	that	can	open	up	critical	information	faster;	torture	does	not	
deliver	information	that	would	otherwise	be	unavailable;	it	only	leads	to	public	
relation	disasters	that	dooms	counterinsurgency.	Set	aside	the	immorality	of	
torture,	it	remains	completely	irrational	as	a	counterinsurgency	strategy	as	the	
consequences	by	far	outweigh	the	benefits	it	provides.	Images	of	the	events,	a	la	Abu	
Ghraib’s	infamous	photoset,	or	retellings	of	the	individual	stories	reinforce	the	
insurgents	cause,	and	in	the	case	of	the	GWOT,	the	torture	gave	the	Islamic	
Fundamentalist	the	claim	that	the	West	is	specifically	targeting	Muslims.	Those	
scandals	play	right	into	the	hands	of	the	insurgents,	delivering	them	a	moral	victory	
that	can	easily	lead	to	a	strategic	one.	Torture	surrenders	the	moral	high	ground	to	
the	insurgents,	and	it	encourages	them	to	escalate	levels	of	brutality.	Sanctioning	
torture	by	state	agencies	in	a	counterinsurgency	setting	effectively	precludes	
victory,	and	extends	the	conflict,	hemorrhaging	the	lives	of	its	men,	and	the	coin	in	
its	treasury	into	a	battle	it	cannot	win.	Counterinsurgency	operations	must	be	
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testimony	in	the	citation	section.	
315	Ibid.,	92.	
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waged	with	forethought,	patient	intelligence	gathering,	an	understanding	of	the	
operational	environment,	and	of	the	populace	upon	whom	the	entire	venture	rides.	
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Glossary	
ALN	(Armée	Liberation	Nationale):	The	military	arm	of	the	Algerian	insurgency.	
AQ	(Al-Qaeda):	Formed	by	Fundamentalist	Islamists	in	the	1980s,	AQ	was	the	
archetypal	international	Jihadi	terrorist	organization.	
ANA	(Afghan	National	Army):	The	NATO	and	ISAF	founded	military	that	has	since	
collapsed	ahead	of	the	Taliban	following	the	US	withdrawal.	
ANP	(Afghan	National	Police):	The	police	force	founded	by	NATO	nations	within	
ISAF	for	Afghanistan,	also	collapsed.			
CIA	(Central	Intelligence	Agency):	The	United	States	of	America’s	foreign	
intelligence	service.		
EIT	(Enhanced	Interrogation	Techniques):	The	euphemism	for	torture	invented	by	
members	of	the	Bush	administration	and	the	CIA.		
FBI	(Federal	Bureau	of	Investigation):	The	United	States	internal	policing,	
investigation,	and	cross	border	security	service.		
FFL	(French	Foreign	Legion):	The	French	Foreign	Legion	is	composed	mainly	of	
foreign	nationals	who	wish	to	leave	their	lives	behind,	and	become	French	citizens.		
FLN	(Fronte	Liberation	Nationale):	The	political,	guerrilla,	and	terror	arm	of	the	
Algerian	independence	movement.			
GWOT	(Global	War	on	Terror):	The	title	given	by	George	W.	Bush	to	the	
international	efforts	to	punish	the	architects	of	the	9/11	attacks.		
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ISAF	(International	Stabilization	and	Assistance	Force):	ISAF	effectively	took	over	
operations	in	Afghanistan	from	NATO,	as	the	goals	had	swapped	from	combat	to	
reconstruction.	
RDI	(Rendition,	Detention,	Interrogation):	RDI	is	the	immediate	predecessor	of	
Enhanced	Interrogation	Techniques.	The	activities	of	RDI	are	effectively	the	same	as	
EIT.	
RMA	(Revolution	in	Military	Affairs):	RMA	describes	the	school	of	thought	involving	
modernization	and	technological	integration	for	militaries.		
SOCOM	(Special	Operations	Command):	SOCOM	is	the	American	military’s	central	
command	structure	for	Special	Operations	forces	from	all	branches.		
OAS	(Organization	Armée	Secrète):	A	right	wing	group	composed	largely	of	French	
military	personnel	serving	in	Algeria.	
	
